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OVERCOMING NECESSITY:
TORTURE AND THE STATE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Thomas P. Crocker*
I. INTRODUCTIONN ECESSITY has played a prominent role in post-September 11
events, purporting to justify official government actions, includ-
ing torture.' The topic of torture has become pervasive in Amer-
ican discourse over national security and foreign affairs, with Bush
Administration officials admitting that they have subjected detainees to
"waterboarding" and other "harsh" interrogation techniques.2 Internal
Department of Justice memos reveal that Administration officials have
considered possible justifications for use of torture or "harsh interroga-
tion" techniques. 3 Moreover, the question of whether torture might be
necessary in some circumstances has entered the national consciousness,
4
not simply through debate over imaginary "what if" scenarios,5 but also
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
J.D. Yale; Ph.D. Vanderbilt. I would like to thank Holly Crocker, Jay Bernstein, Amy
Cohen, Bernard Harcourt, Jill Fraley, Scott Hershovitz, Ekow Yankah, Dan Markel,
Zachary Kramer, Carissa Hessick, Jason Solomon, Rob Kar, David Fagundes, Gowri
Ramachandran, Michael Waterstone, and Steve Vladeck for helpful comments, conversa-
tions, and suggestions. I would like to thank Kristina Cooper for her outstanding research
assistance.
1. Jeremy Waldron is correct to note that "[i]t is dispiriting as well as shameful to
have to turn our attention to this issue." Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Juris-
prudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1683 (2005). See also Seth
Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the
War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 278 (2003) ("There are some articles I never
thought I would have to write; this is one.").
2. Scott Shane, CIA Chief Doubts Tactic to Interrogate Is Still Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2008, at A9; Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al.
3. David Johnston & Scott Shane, Memo Sheds New Light on Torture Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A19. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel to William Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def.
(Mar. 14, 2003) (regarding the "Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held
Outside the United States") [hereinafter "Yoo Memo"].
4. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into Discussion by News Media, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001. Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, AnANTIc MONTHLY,
Oct. 2003, at 51.
5. See FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL To REVIEW DoD DETENTION
OPERATIONS (Aug. 2004), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA,
ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 401 (2004) ("For the U.S., most cases for permit-
ting harsh treatment of detainees on moral grounds begin with variants of the 'ticking time
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through government action6 and popular culture. 7 Because it touches
core moral, political, and legal conceptions of the proper limits to state
power and the obligations owed to other persons, torture has also be-
come a topic of intense academic debate. Indeed, there may now be an
academic consensus that in extreme circumstances one could justify the
practice of torture as a lesser evil to avoid the greater evil of many
thousands, or even millions, of innocent deaths.8
What is interesting about this growing cacophony (one hesitates to call
it a chorus) is that in the very few years following the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the focus on human rights, which included a near-universal
consensus on the prohibitory norm against torture, could dissipate so
quickly. In a series of cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute, U.S.
federal courts have proclaimed that the prohibition against torture is one
of the jus cogens norms, such that the "torturer has become like the pi-
rate and the slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of
all mankind."9  Commentators and international law treatises have
largely agreed. International treaties to which the United States is a sig-
natory, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
bomb' scenario."). For criticism of the hypothetical, see Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 124, 141-42 (1978).
6. For example, recall the events at Abu Ghraib. See generally DANNER, supra note5. "[E]veryone seems to acknowledge that the U.S. government continues to torture or
use other kinds of shadowy, cruel practices all the time. Before, we treated torture as
absolutely forbidden. Now, we accept that even as we speak, our government is engaged in
a widespread set of shadowy cruel practices on ghost detainees held abroad." Harold
Hongju Koh, Can the President be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1151 (2005).
7. Perhaps the most relevant to the threat of terrorism is the popular show "24." See
Jane Mayer, Whatever it Takes: The politics of the man behind "24", THE NEW YORKER,
Feb. 19, 2007, at 66; see also Teresa Wilz, Torture's Tortured Cultural Roots, WASH. POST,
May 3, 2005, at C1 ("If you're addicted to Fox's '24,' you probably cheered on Jack Bauer
when, in a recent episode, he snapped the fingers of a suspect who was, shall we say,
reluctant to talk .... Torture's a no-brainer here. Jack's got to save us all from imminent
thermonuclear annihilation.").
8. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN
AGE OF TERROR (2004). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRE-
CAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 221 (2005) ("In imaginable circumstances, torture is indeedjustifiable.").
9. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). See also, Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the right to be free from torture is a norm of jus
cogens); Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Given this
extraordinary consensus, we conclude that the right to be free from official torture is fun-
damental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law, a
norm of jus cogens."). The Supreme Court applied the Filartiga approach to private rights
of action under the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732
(2004).




or Punishment,1 1 and the Geneva Conventions,12 all prohibit the use of
torture. Moreover, the Convention Against Torture contains an explicit
non-derogation provision, proclaiming that "[n]o exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever ... may be invoked as a justification for torture. ' 13
The Supreme Court has declared that the use of torture violates the Due
Process Clause. 14 In the words of Justice Kennedy, the "use of torture or
its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an individual's
fundamental right to liberty of the person."115 Presidential statements af-
firm the unequivocal fact that "America stands against and will not toler-
ate torture."
'16
Despite Congress's implementation of legislation forbidding the prac-
tice of torture,' 7 and despite recent legislative prohibitions and pro-
nouncements,1 8 the conversation concerning torture continues, and most
likely, so too does the practice. Why is so much attention paid to such a
gruesome practice? The simple answer is that the practice may appear
necessary in response to threats from global terrorism. Necessity, how-
ever, has a vexed relation to constitutional principle. Constitutional prin-
ciples function as constraints on official action only when officials are
tempted to exceed principled boundaries. If there is no temptation, there
is no constraint. If, however, necessity trumps principle when officials are
tempted by circumstances to violate the Constitution, then constitutional
principles offer no constraints precisely when they most apply. Thus, the
role we assign to necessity fundamentally shapes constitutional practice
and culture.
Another reason for the continuing discursive salience of torture is the
existence of countervailing practices and principles within U.S. constitu-
tional doctrine and debate. On the one hand, rights provide limits to the
exercise of state power over individuals. On the other hand, rights are
11. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 85 U.N.T.S. 1465 [hereinafter Conven-
tion Against Torture].
12. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, § 1(a) and art. 12, Aug. 12, 1947, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 32, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
13. Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, art.2.
14. See e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (overturning convictions
based on confessions elicited by torture as breaches of due process, violating "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions").
15. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 796 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
16. Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
1 PuB. PAPERS 1141 (June 26, 2004).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a)-(b) (2000) (providing for criminal sanctions against per-
petrators of torture). See also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 135 note (2000)) (authorizing civil liability
against perpetrators of torture).
18. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119




protected always against the backdrop of state interests. Under appropri-
ate conditions, some rights may be balanced against governmental inter-
ests to allow actions that might otherwise violate those rights. Under the
Constitution, we frequently do not view basic rights, such as the right to
free speech or due process, as absolute. Often the time, place, and man-
ner of our speech is subject to regulations seeking to achieve an impor-
tant government interest. 19 Moreover, we have a right not to be deprived
of life without due process of law, but in some circumstances state agents
will be justified in using extra-judicial "deadly force" against a dangerous
individual.20 The more compelling the state's interest in deviating from
absolute respect for a right, the greater the justification for the state's
action, and the more willing a court will be to find the official action con-
stitutional. The most compelling form of state interest is expressed in
terms of necessity.
Necessity arguments claim that in particular circumstances officials
may undertake exceptional actions to achieve their legitimate goals, such
as protecting national security, that would otherwise be prohibited if the
normal rule of law governed during normal conditions. Necessity is
closely related to the practice of balancing rights against competing inter-
ests such as security, because, "[a]s threats increase, the value of security
increases," and the "government will then trade off some losses in liberty
for greater gains in increased security. ' 21 Thus, by accepting the principle
that under conditions of necessity there is an appropriate balance be-
tween liberty and security, officials may seek to justify practices that de-
prive individuals of their human dignity by subjecting them to torture or
to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Expediency and necessity
thus seem to pull in the direction of unfettered action. After all, the
threats are real, as well as possibly grave. Adherence to principles, by
contrast, requires official restraint in accordance with prior constitutional
commitment.
Those who would justify the practice of torture, if only in extreme cir-
cumstances, do so by appeal to necessity. Necessity often appears as a
compelling state interest to act in particular circumstances in ways that
might otherwise violate a constitutional right. Claims to necessity also
have compelling rhetorical force. It can be difficult to oppose what is
deemed necessary in concrete circumstances by appeal to abstract consti-
tutional principles. When generalized as a justification for official action,
necessity can displace constitutional commitments to constrained action
because necessity, not the Constitution, becomes the ultimate arbiter for
19. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding a state stat-
ute requiring a license to march on city streets because the state "cannot be denied author-
ity to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in
relation to the other proper uses of the streets").
20. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
21. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 27 (2007).
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authorizing actions.22 For example, although shying away from embrac-
ing the term "torture," Vice President Dick Cheney has stated, concern-
ing the waterboarding of suspected terrorist, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
that "[h]e and others were questioned at a time when another attack on
this country was believed to be imminent. It's a good thing we had them
in custody, and it's a good thing we found out what they knew."'23 Ac-
cording to the Vice President, circumstances render necessary the use of
"harsh interrogation" in order to ensure protection for national secur-
ity-"we" need to know what they know. The now notorious Depart-
ment of Justice "torture memo," which sought to justify unilateral
executive action to engage in practices that would include torture, also
relied on necessity arguments.24 Indeed, the memo explicitly argued that
statutory prohibitions against torture are unconstitutional insofar as they
"seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes
necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States."'25 Even if Depart-
ment of Justice officials sought to hold officials engaging in torture at the
behest of the President criminally liable for their actions, according to the
memo, "[s]tandard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense
could justify interrogation methods needed to elicit information to pre-
vent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its citizens."
26
Emergencies and other exigent circumstances thus present the follow-
ing problem: external threats may seem to require actions, such as tor-
ture, that violate fundamental law. When acting according to necessity,
we either act outside the law, or we find justification for acting from prin-
ciples embedded in the law. Latent principles of necessity, found in the
Constitution under the latter approach, rescue otherwise lawless actions
by according them rule-of-law status, operating under special conditions
of necessity. A "necessity Constitution" provides the flexibility that exec-
utive officials believe is required to respond effectively to real and per-
ceived threats to national security. This approach is problematic,
however, because necessity subjects all rights to derogation as circum-
stances require, undermining the notion of rights as principled con-
straints. For those who think that consequence trumps constraint, it
follows that all rights are subject to balance by executive officials, free
from other institutional constraints, as circumstances dictate. As I shall
argue, consequentialist apology on behalf of unfettered executive action
during claimed emergencies fails to account for prominent features of our
constitutional culture, including pervasive suspicion of unchecked and un-
22. See Thomas P. Crocker, Still Waiting for the Barbarians: What Is New about Post-
September 11 Exceptionalism?, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 303 (2007).
23. David Stout & Scott Shane, Cheney Defends Use of Harsh Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008.
24. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President 39-41 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter "Bybee Memo"].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 39.
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balanced unilateral action.27 Even if thought necessary under the circum-
stances, legitimating the practice of torture ultimately alters central,
constitutional commitments, subjecting them to derogation on the basis
of vague notions of necessity. Moreover, unprincipled claims to necessity
depend on the perceptions of the very officials the law is meant to con-
strain. I argue that if necessity becomes a route to unconstrained official
action, then to the extent that abiding constitutional commitments remain
relevant to constitutional culture, we must overcome the temptation to
rely on necessity.
If an internal principle of constitutional necessity is unavailable, then
perhaps officials can rely on an external principle of necessity. When offi-
cials act outside the constraints of fundamental law, the domain of law
remains unsullied, but action taken according to necessity becomes law-
less. In this situation, the difference between lawful and lawless action is
determined by conditions external to law-the very circumstances that
give rise to claims of necessity. But is lawless action illegitimate, espe-
cially if the stakes for national security are high? Might the Constitution
be entirely consistent with extra-constitutional authority in times of emer-
gency or crisis? 28 Legitimacy rests on consent of the people. If the peo-
ple consent to lawless practices, then they grant an important form of
legitimacy to those practices, even though their consent comes at the ex-
pense of strict adherence to the Constitution. Consent presupposes limits
on actions in accordance with the fundamental dignity, autonomy, and
liberty of persons-the constitutive substance of due process. When per-
sons are not afforded these protections, official action attacks the very
conditions of legitimacy. Consent also flows from a self-conception of
who we are as a constitutional culture. A self-conception embedded in
constitutional culture is not fixed and final, but responds to circumstances
and to perceptions of our current situation. Thus, constitutional equilib-
rium is always fragile. Our shared responses to crises can always legiti-
mate actions that, in turn, change our constitutional culture. These
considerations reveal the underlying fragility of any particular state of
constitutional culture. Constitutional practices may change in light of ex-
ternal conditions and popular consent. In this way, constitutional culture
is not merely a matter of Supreme Court constitutional opinion, but is a
matter of the interaction between citizens and officials.29
Relying on necessity to justify extralegal official action is therefore es-
pecially problematic for constitutional culture. How both officials and
citizens see their shared social and political world as an ordered whole,
expressive of core values and commitments and embedded in particular
27. For a sustained critique of consequentialist apologies for unconstrained executive
authority to engage in practices such as torture, see Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with
Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569, 601-07 (2008).
28. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J.
1383 (1989).
29. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Changes: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1323 (2006).
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practices, comprises fundamental features of a constitutional culture. As
such, constitutional culture is susceptible to a particular form of fragil-
ity-it can be altered in fundamental ways by shifts in the meaning and
application of its defining constitutional principles and commitments.
Meaning changes as practices change. The prohibition against torture,
although not explicitly embedded in constitutional text, has taken on a
fundamental role in expressing a central commitment to the dignity and
liberty of persons. This commitment is further embedded as a core fea-
ture not only of domestic law, but also of regional and international
human rights instruments. So when talk turns to torture, and when prac-
tice follows, we begin to change core constitutional meanings, which in
turn reshape constitutional culture. New constitutional understandings
can further institutionalize these transformative practices. We may begin
to live under a Constitution of necessity rather than a Constitution of
constraint.
If these changes were easily circumscribed within the emergency situa-
tion, perhaps there would be less reason to be concerned. As I will argue,
however, changes regarding fundamental aspects of constitutional culture
cannot be isolated, especially given the tendency of necessity to become
normalized. Engaging in exceptional practices such as torture can change
how we see other principled commitments that remain equally subject to
balancing under conditions of necessity. The ultimate issue is not
whether a particular action by a particular state official offends or com-
plies with the Constitution. Rather, it is whether a particular way of pri-
oritizing necessity is one that is made available within a particular
constitutional culture. When we prioritize necessity, we change how we
look at the world in ways that have pervasive legal and cultural conse-
quences. To avoid justifying practices such as torture under perceived
emergency or exigent circumstances, we must learn to overcome necessity
as a way of limiting legal constraints to normal occasions. This Article
argues that we should overcome the temptation to rely on necessity,
whether construed as an internal constitutional principle or as an extra-
legal justification, when doing so threatens to alter our broader commit-
ments to living under constitutional constraints reflected in rights-pro-
tecting and separation of powers principles.
II. THE NECESSITY CONSTITUTION
Finding an implicit principle of necessity nestled among the Constitu-
tion's other enumerated powers is the simplest route to justifying uncon-
strained executive authority in times of perceived emergency or exigency.
Indeed, such a principle retains executive action within the purview of the
Constitution by finding a constitutionally authorized way to prioritize ne-
cessity over other constitutional values. As Michael Paulsen posits, "the
Constitution either creates or recognizes a constitutional law of necessity,
and appears to charge the President with the primary duty of applying it
2008]
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and judging the degree of necessity in the press of circumstances. '30 As I
shall argue, the problem with this approach is that it invites executive
officials to see everything in terms of emergency and exigency. How
much easier it would be to claim emergency and thereby act free from
principled constraints and judicial review. More than the national secur-
ity constitution,31 we invite the creation of the national necessity constitu-
tion. Those who live under such a constitution will be inclined to see the
world as organized around the authority of necessity, rather than on enu-
merated, and limited, government powers. I argue that no such principle
of necessity resides, latently or implicitly, in our Constitution. To the ex-
tent that the Constitution does not support an internal principle of neces-
sity, then executive claims to act on the basis of necessity become lawless.
The extra-legal nature of such action may provide the basis for institu-
tional restraint, but if Congress, the courts, and the citizenry consent to
such actions, our constitutional culture becomes one circumscribed by
regular illegality, which likewise constructs its own problematic way of
seeing the world. The ultimate issue necessity raises is whether we want
to sustain a constitutional culture based on principle and commitment to
fundamental values of human dignity and liberty, or whether we want to
create a constitutional culture subordinate to the indefinite concepts of
emergency and exigency.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY
Under the Constitution of necessity, state vulnerability sometimes re-
quires extra-legal action. There are two ways the Constitution can ac-
commodate necessity: externally and internally. First, the Constitution of
necessity may sanction extra-legal action that preserves traditional pow-
ers of executive prerogative. Second, the Constitution of necessity may
contain an internal principle of necessity tethered to constitutional struc-
ture and text.
1. Is There an External Principle of Necessity?
Operating under the "law of necessity," executive officials would be
justified in suspending the Constitution, in whole or in part, in times of
perceived emergency in order to address a dangerous situation free from
ordinary legal constraint. Under emergency circumstances, extra-legal
action may be required because normal legal limitations, such as those
protecting civil liberties, may conflict with those security measures
deemed necessary to preserve the nation's survival. Thus, during times of
emergency, officials would be justified in suspending civil liberties in or-
der to preserve them for the future. Such actions are not without serious
and troubling consequences. When this theory has been put into practice,
30. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257, 1258 (2004) (emphasis added).
31. See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
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civil liberties have been suspended or circumvented, whether by the sup-
pression of political dissent, internment of Japanese Americans, or the
practice of domestic spying.32 When acting to accomplish what necessity
requires, ordinary legal constraints easily give way to overriding
demands.
With regard to the external authority of necessity, the work of Carl
Schmitt, a Weimar Republic political theorist, suggests one way of relat-
ing the rule of law under ordinary circumstances to law, or its absence,
under exceptional circumstances. 33 Whether there is a constitutional or
extra-constitutional principle of necessity, one way of understanding what
happens in emergency situations is in terms of what Schmitt calls the state
of exception. 34 Under the state of exception, Schmitt observes that "[t]he
state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-
preservation. ' ' 35 What exists as normal is bounded by the domain of ne-
cessity, which includes a prior right and duty to preserve the state against
existential threats. According to Schmitt, the sovereign is the one who
has the power to decide when the exception exists. "For a legal order to
make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who defi-
nitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists. All law is
'situational law.' The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in
its totality."'3 6 The sovereign decides whether the state of exception ex-
ists, justifying suspension of the ordinary rule of law in the name of pre-
serving it, based on conditions of necessity.37 This preserving function
can lead to perverse results. For example, Article 48 of the Weimar Con-
stitution specifically provided for a state of emergency, a device often
used, and with the rise of the Nazi Party, a device that superseded the
rule of law it was meant to preserve. 38 The ready resort to emergency
32. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
(2004); see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 228-29 (2003) (stating that governments
overreact in times of crisis and that "at some point after-and often long after-the emer-
gency has passed, the government's conduct is widely acknowledged to have been an
overreaction").
33. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emer-
gency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 706 (2006) ("[T]he legal philosopher who provides the best
understanding of the legal theory of the Bush Administration is Carl Schmitt .. "); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of
9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1009 (2004) ("[T]he place to start in thinking about theo-
retical justifications for states of emergency in a system of democratically accountable, rep-
resentative, and rights-respecting government is with Carl Schmitt.").
34. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 12 (George Schwab trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1985) (1922).
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Giorgio Agamben observes that "[t]he state of exception is not a special kind of
law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it
defines law's threshold or limit concept." GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 4
(Kevin Attell trans., U. Chi. Press 2005) (2003).
38. See id. at 2 ("[F]rom a juridical standpoint the entire Third Reich can be consid-
ered a state of exception that lasted twelve years."). See also CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CON-
STITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 33-37
(1948) (detailing the origins of Article 48); Scheppele, supra note 33, at 1007-09.
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powers in the name of preserving constitutional order repeatedly proved
too tempting, normalizing a state of emergency in everyday life.39 Thus,
one observation to make is that when exceptional circumstances arise jus-
tifying actions taken under the rule of necessity, and when the executive
has the authority to decide when those circumstances exist, there is a risk
that such exceptions may become increasingly normal.
Although not articulated specifically as states of emergency or excep-
tion, the Bush Administration has justified its powers and policies in pub-
lic statements, memos, and court filings broadly within Schmitt's
framework.40 One persistent feature of the post-September 11 situation
is the Administration's rhetorical invocation of war.4' President Bush
warned, "[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated. ' 42 By invoking a so-called "war on terror-
ism," government officials seek the availability of exceptional powers to
act. Moreover, by figuring the scope of the war to have "global reach"
and indefinite temporal limits, those exceptional powers risk becoming a
normalized feature of our constitutional order.4 3
Necessity, in terms of Presidential war power, can provide substantial
latitude for executive action. As the Supreme Court stated in the The
Prize Cases,44 "[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He
does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority. '45 Because the challenge is
levied by others, the scope of the President's authority to act is dictated
post hoc by the circumstances, not ex ante by ordinary constitutional con-
39. Scheppele, supra note 33, at 1008.
40. For example, the Administration claims: "The Constitution vests the political
branches and, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief, with the power necessary to 'provide
for the common defense,' . . . including the authority to vanquish the enemy and repel
foreign attack in time of war." Brief for Respondents at 13, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
41. As the President urged in his 2004 State of the Union Address: "After the chaos
and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.
The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they
got." Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 84 (Jan. 20, 2004). The President further warned that: "This war will not be like
the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclu-
sion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops
were used and not a single American was lost in combat .... Americans should not expect
one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include
dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success." Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist
Attacks of Sept. 11, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1142 (Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter "Address on Re-
sponse to Attacks of Sept. 11"].
42. Address on Response to Attacks of Sept. 11, supra note 41, at 1141.
43. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 169 (1948) ("Whether and when it would be
open to this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is
a question too fraught with gravity even to be adequately formulated when not
compelled.").
44. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
45. Id. at 668.
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straints. In relation to standards for interrogation during this "war on
terror," the Bush Administration has claimed that "[i]n wartime, it is for
the President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against
the enemy."'46 This claim draws close to Schmitt's theory of the excep-
tion, for the Bush Administration has claimed both the power to decide
the terms of the emergency and the power to declare, without check, who
is the "enemy combatant. ' 47 By emphasizing the rhetoric of war, which
invokes situations analogous to repelling an invasion or quelling an insur-
rection, the President has attempted to justify acting alone and un-
checked, as the circumstances of necessity might require.
When we are at war, Presidential power expands, both politically and
constitutionally. Politically, the President has the first-mover advan-
tage-the ability to put troops in the field and take advantage of the
"'rally round the flag' effect"-thereby making it very difficult to mobil-
ize political opposition in Congress. 48 Moreover, in a state of war or
emergency, courts are reluctant to intervene.4 9 Although more recently
the Supreme Court has made clear that "a state of war is not a blank
check for the President, ' ' 5° at least "when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens,"' 5' precedent also provides that decisions made "by the
President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army in time of war and grave public danger-are not to be set
aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in conflict
with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted. 52
Thus, by deploying the rhetoric of war, the President gains political space
to act as necessary, substantially, though not entirely free from interfer-
ence by Congress or intervention by the courts.53
Constitutionally, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the power
and duty to provide for the common defense and to prevent and repel
attacks on the nation. 54 He has very wide latitude to conduct foreign
46. Bybee Memo, supra note 24, at 38.
47. The Bush Administration argued that it had unilateral authority to declare persons
enemy combatants. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); see also Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004) (addressing the detention of two Australian and twelve Kuwaiti
citizens as enemy combatants).
48. See Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2678 (2005) (noting further that first-mover advantage can also be
effective in getting additional authorization from Congress).
49. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
645 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring) ("We should not use this occasion to circumscribe,
much less contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-Chief.").
50. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
51. Id.
52. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) ("The law must accord the Exec-
utive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger to our
security."). The Boumediene Court, however, held that habeas applies to Guantanamo
detainees, depriving the President of authority to act free from judicial review. Id. at 2262.
54. In its arguments to the Supreme Court, the Bush Administration asserted that
"[t]he Framers appreciated the importance of giving the Executive unquestioned authority
to defend against foreign attack. As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 70, '[d]ecision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch' are characteristic of a unitary executive power and are 'es-
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
affairs. As the Supreme Court has made clear, with regard to authority
over foreign affairs, the President "has his confidential sources of infor-
mation. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
results."' 55 Under war or threats from abroad, the President's inherent
power under the Constitution to act as the sole agent of national policy is
at its highest, and courts will be maximally deferential, and Congress least
likely to intrude.5 6
The rhetoric of war, however, is not the same as the reality of war.
Genuine existential threats provide the most compelling conditions for
executive action controlled by claims to necessity. Extra-legal action is
justified under this framework only when actions taken under normal
conditions would be insufficient to address the existential threat. Not all
threats are existential in nature, however, and thus not all emergencies
invoke states of exception. It is debatable as to whether, and to what
extent, the post-September 11 threat of terrorism is a situation that can
be adequately addressed through normal criminal process or whether ex-
ceptional war powers are required.57 The current threat of terrorism,
however, cannot plausibly be described as "existential." Terrorist attacks
can be catastrophic, traumatic, and searing, but there are no armies mas-
sing at the border, and no long-range nuclear weapons ready to launch,
differentiating our situation from both traditional and "cold" wars. To
recognize this fact is not to minimize the threat or the political pressures
that emerge in relation to such a threat. 58 Caution, however, is in order.
In practice, necessity in time of war had its best precedent in the ac-
tions, and later justifications, of Abraham Lincoln. Justifying actions he
took during the Civil War in an April 1864 letter to Senator Albert G.
Hodges, Lincoln wrote: "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional,
sential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks."' Brief for Respon-
dents, supra note 40, at 13 n.4.
55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
56. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 54-60 (1993); KOH, supra note 31, at 134; Aharon Barak,
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 125 (2003).
57. Compare John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 574 (2006) ("The
days when society considered terrorism merely a law enforcement problem and when our
forces against terrorism were limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, federal prose-
cutors, and the criminal justice system will not return."), with David Luban, The War on
Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y Q. 9, 14 (2002) (arguing
that the war on terrorism "includes a new model of state action, the hybrid war-law model,
which depresses human rights from their peace-time standard to the war-time standard").
Providing the most sustained analysis of the differences between reacting to terrorist at-
tacks in terms of crime or war, Bruce Ackerman advocates a third way-what he calls the
emergency constitution-"a way of expressing law and morality in a distinctive key, guided
by special principles." BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 57 (2006).
58. As Bruce Ackerman discusses, terrorist attacks do undermine the "effective sover-
eignty" of the government, revealing the state's inability to provide for the security of the
nation. Id. at 41.44.
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might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the constitution, through the preservation of the nation. ' 59 These "other-
wise unconstitutional" measures included suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, raising an army, authorizing arrest and detention of persons sus-
pected of disloyalty, emancipating the slaves, and generally acting as an
effective dictator for the ten weeks from April 15 until July 4, 1861.60
Indeed, Lincoln's actions exemplify, in practice, the theoretical power of
the executive to declare a state of exception and to suspend the Constitu-
tion for purposes of preserving the nation.6 1 Lincoln resisted the sugges-
tion that the Constitution applies without alteration (or suspension)
during times of war: "[T]he Constitution is not, in its application, in all
respects the same, in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public
safety, as it is in time of profound peace and public security. '62 In re-
sponse to Chief Justice Taney's ruling in Ex Parte Merryman,63 which held
that he lacked the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus unilater-
ally, Lincoln responded by posing to Congress the famous rhetorical
question: "[A]re all laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" 64 The imagery of the gov-
ernment going to pieces highlights the appeal to necessity here in the
context of a dire existential threat. To emphasize the dire existential cri-
ses in which he suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in the same message
to Congress, Lincoln observed that "[t]he whole of the laws which were
required to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of exe-
cution, in nearly one-third of the States."' 65 Under the circumstances Lin-
coln faced, if he did not act outside of constitutional constraint, then the
overriding existential threat might have resulted in there being no Consti-
tution to uphold. Far from becoming a constitutional pariah for his extra-
legal actions, Lincoln received post hoc congressional approval.6 6
Like Lincoln, President Roosevelt also faced an existential threat to
the nation in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on Pearl Harbor.
59. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 585 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989)
[hereinafter "Fehrenbacher"].
60. See generally, DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION (2003); GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 80-134 (2004); AMBAGEN, supra note
37, at 20.
61. See AGAMBEN, supra note 37, at 20-21 (detailing the ways that Lincoln's actions
fall within Carl Schmitt's theory of the exception).
62. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 59, at 460.
63. 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
64. Fehrenbacher, supra note 59, at 253.
65. Id. at 252-53.
66. Henry P. Managhan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
74 n.136 (1993). Bush Administration domestic surveillance practices that some have ar-
gued lacked sufficient legal authority were also given post hoc Congressional approval in
recent legislation. Richard H. Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists:
Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 449, 452 (2008)




Stating the wartime need to provide "every possible protection against
espionage and against sabotage," Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066
authorizing the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast.67 When the constitutionality of this Order came before the Su-
preme Court, the President obtained judicial authorization for his consti-
tutionally questionable actions. Because "authorities feared an invasion
•.. and felt constrained to take proper security measures, '68 the Court
reasoned that "exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed neces-
sary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal
members of the group."'69 The Court admitted that the President had no
authority under the Constitution to exclude persons from their homes in
this way, but for the fact that he acted "under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril."' 70 In this situation, constitutional constraints on
presidential power are themselves limited by claims to necessity. If an
emergency condition occurs, then the scope of the Constitution may be
altered, or even suspended, in the name of existential preservation. The
Supreme Court stated the principle at work in these terms: "But when
under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger."'71 Under this principle of necessity, the circumstances determine
the scope of presidential power, not the Constitution.
Genuine existential threats to the survival of the country provide the
most justifiable occasions for extra-legal government action. Accord-
ingly, Lincoln's wartime precedent exemplifies what Kevin Heller has la-
beled the "survival rule," a rule that allows extra-constitutional action
only when absolutely indispensable to preserving the state.72 Such an ap-
peal to necessity, however, is exceedingly narrow in scope, much nar-
rower than current claims of necessity made in pursuit of the war on
terror.73
2. Is There an Internal Principle of Necessity?
Perhaps such a principle of necessity is not incompatible with normal
constitutional constraints. James Madison indicated as much in the Fed-
eralist No. 41: "It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the im-
pulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the
Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of
which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. '74 Madison
67. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
68. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223 (1944).
69. Id. at 218.
70. Id. at 220.
71. Id.
72. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rhetoric of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson's Pinteresque
Conversation), 40 GA. L. REV. 779, 785 (2006).
73. See RossITER, supra note 38, at 298 (noting that extra-legal actions are justified
only if "it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the state and its consti-
tutional order").
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 41 at 257 (James Madison) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 41].
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makes two claims here. First, a normative claim that it is vain to use
constitutional constraints to limit executive power to take actions against
existential threats. Second, if the Constitution were used to constrain
such action, then it would create constitutional dissonance by inviting the
executive to follow the "law of necessity" rather than the Constitution.
As we have already observed, two primary methods exist for resolving
this apparent incompatibility between necessity and the Constitution. We
can either recognize that the law of necessity and the Constitution each
operate in separate, mutually exclusive spheres, or we can find within the
Constitution a principle of necessity itself.
Turning now to the second approach, if the Constitution contains
within its structure a principle of necessity, then there would be no need
for constitutional conflict. Under the appropriate circumstances, the con-
stitutional principle of necessity would authorize executive action unfet-
tered from other constraints. 75 On the basis of the Presidential Oath
Clause, in which the President affirms his duty to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States, '76 Michael Paulsen argues
that a constitutional principle of necessity gives the President power to
act outside of "practically any other constitutional rule set forth in the
document. '77 He argues that this principle does not entail exceptional
powers or powers to suspend the Constitution; rather, it is itself a consti-
tutional power to protect the nation.78 Paulsen further contends that a
constitutional law of necessity must exist to make it possible for the Presi-
dent to fulfill his oath, translating in the process the object of that oath-
the "Constitution"-to "the nation. '79
Construing the Presidential Oath Clause, the Supreme Court has also
found, at least in dicta, presidential power to act as necessary in the face
of an existential threat: "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our
Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlaw-
ful means."8 0 Such an approach has the virtue of constitutionalizing ne-
cessity, thereby eliminating the apparent dissonance between
constitutional principles and necessity. It has the vice, however, of find-
75. Paulsen, supra note 30, at 1260-63. He is not the first to attribute distinctive Presi-
dential power to the oath. Stephen G. Calabresi and Saikirshna B. Prakash argue that the
presidential oath provides the president with the "means of refusing to enforce laws that
violate the supreme law of the Constitution, particularly where those laws usurp the consti-
tutional prerogatives." Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 621-22 (1994).
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
77. Paulsen, supra note 30, at 1283.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972). In
Keith, the Court balanced national security needs against the loss of privacy entailed by
electronic surveillance, ultimately concluding that the Fourth Amendment placed limits on
the President's authority to conduct surveillance free from any judicial oversight. Thus, the
Court rejected a claim of presidential power to act under claims of national necessity, con-
cluding that "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic se-
curity surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive
Branch." Id. at 316-17.
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ing at the core of the Constitution a consequentialist principle that gives
the President power to act free from other constitutional limitations.
One could view this as a positive development. In times of emergency,
we might want the President to have a free hand in charting the best
course of action to respond to the situation.8a Excess concern for civil
liberties or other constitutional constraints may lead to actual harm to the
nation. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have affirmed this possibility,
asserting that "it is clear, however, that sometimes tangible security
harms do in fact occur when claims of civil liberties are respected. '82
Moreover they assert that "[c]onstitutional rules do no good, and some
harm, if they block government's attempts to adjust the balance as threats
wax and wane."'83 Proper response to emergencies requires the President
to balance "a straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security. '84
On this view, under the Constitution of necessity, the President is justi-
fied in limiting civil liberties in order to promote security. 85 Because civil
rights and liberties are not absolute, they cannot serve as principled barri-
ers to effective government action aimed at protecting national security.
Posner and Vermuele do not ground their argument for tradeoffs in the
Presidential Oath Clause. Rather, they make empirical, institutional, and
normative claims that the executive is best situated to decide security
policy during emergencies; therefore, courts, Congress, and citizens
should all defer to those decisions.8 6 Paulsen takes the further step of
grounding this balancing act in the Constitution itself.87 Thus, if there is a
principle of necessity at the core of the Constitution, there would be no
need for officials to act in an extra-legal manner. Necessity becomes in-
separable from the Constitution.
Under this Constitution of necessity, not only does the President have
the power to act as necessary in appropriate circumstances; he is the of-
ficer charged with deciding the circumstances. Moreover, the circum-
stances need not be strictly necessary to provide for existential survival
under a narrow "survival rule."'88 Exemplifying this power over the cir-
cumstances of necessity, President Bush justified the invasion of Iraq in
2003 as flowing from his constitutional duty based on his oath of office:
81. In a similar vein, Joel Goldstein states that "the President has a unique relation-
ship to the Constitution, that in addition to his discrete Article II powers and duties, he has
special responsibilities to make certain that the Constitution survives his watch." Joel K.
Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 791, 829 (1999).
82. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 24.
83. Id. at 31.
84. Id. at 12. Richard Posner also notes that "[t]he challenge to constitutional decision
making in the era of modern terrorism is to restrike the balance between the interest in
liberty from government restraint or interference and the interest in public safety, in recog-
nition of the grave threat that terrorism poses to the nation's security." RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 31
(2006).
85. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 15-16.
86. Id. at 158-59.
87. See generally Paulsen, supra note 30.
88. See Heller, supra note 72, at 790-91.
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"The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in
assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-
in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep." 89 In this
case, the power to decide the exception, and to commit military forces in
a foreign land, was not extra-constitutional in nature, especially since
Congress provided authorization for the use of military force. 90 The
President's language is, however, an affirmation of the principle of consti-
tutional necessity based on the Presidential Oath to assure national secur-
ity without reference to other legal constraints or imperatives. 91
One troubling feature of this approach is that it proposes to defer to
decisions made by the very officials who have the greatest interest in act-
ing on necessity, thereby circumventing the ordinary constraints of civil
liberties. The plebiscitary President, responding to public fears, will have
an immense incentive to develop new policies and practices that at least
have the appearance of increasing security by invoking national necessity,
and far less incentive to promote civil liberties, especially if doing so
makes providing security more costly. Justice Souter's concurrence in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld92 makes a similar point in terms of separated powers:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to main-
tain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch
of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the
branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to
victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim
that security legitimately raises.93
Even if Congress has concurrent power to check the worst examples of
presidential abuse by passing legislation pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, once the power for the President to act beyond normal
89. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, President Says Saddam Hus-
sein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html.
90. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
91. This principle also bolsters the status of the President's rhetoric regarding neces-
sity and national security. "In all these efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to
follow a process-it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world
... Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom
and security of the American people." President George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/
20030128-19.html.
92. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
93. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson articulated the problem in this
way: "[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled,
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the
country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture."




constitutional constraints is found at the center of the Constitution, con-
flict between the two branches takes on a new dimension.
Rather than deviating from constitutional design, the President would
now be able to argue that his actions are pursuant to constitutional pur-
pose and principle. Interestingly, in such a conflict, the President may
violate an affirmative duty "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. ' 94 His refusal to execute congressional statutes in the name of his
implicit unilateral authority during time of hostilities may conflict with
that textually explicit duty.
The possibility for conflict is not merely hypothetical. In the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress provided addi-
tional funding for continued military operations in Iraq.95 In that Act,
Congress passed a provision which forbids the President from using the
funds to establish permanent military bases in Iraq.96 In his statement on
signing the Act into law, President Bush claimed:
Provisions of the Act... purport to impose requirements that could
inhibit the President's ability to carry out his constitutional obliga-
tions . . . to protect national security, to supervise the executive
branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The
executive Branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consis-
tent with the constitutional authority of the President.97
President Bush has used signing statements more than any other Presi-
dent, and often with the dubious implication that he purports to rewrite
or ignore provisions that he has signed into law. 98 In this case, the Presi-
dent asserts constitutional obligations that trump his constitutional obli-
gation under the Take Care Clause, leaving open the possibility that the
President might claim authority to establish military bases in contraven-
tion of the Act's explicit prohibition.
Nonetheless, somewhere in the midst of the Commander-in-Chief
power, the Take Care Clause, and the Presidential Oath Clause, some
argue that the President is constitutionally authorized to act according to
necessity, unchecked and unconstrained by other constitutional princi-
ples, particularly in times of national emergency. Such a view is implicit
in the President's signing statement regarding a prohibition against tor-
turing detainees, in which he claimed to construe the Act "in a manner
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 261 (1994) (arguing that
the Take Care Clause supplements and complements the presidential oath as a textual
justification for the president's authority to interpret the laws independent of any other
branch).
95. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986, 110th Cong.
sec. 1222 (2008).
96. Id.
97. President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 4986, the "National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2008" (Jan. 28, 2008), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2008/01/20080128-10.html.
98. See American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and




consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise
the unitary executive branch and as Commander-in-Chief. .. which will
assist in achieving the shared objective . . . of protecting the American
people from further terrorist attacks." 99 The implication is that the Presi-
dent retains power to do what is necessary to protect against future ter-
rorist attacks, unconstrained by the limitations imposed on that power by
congressional statutes. The Bybee memo makes this argument, as a legal
opinion binding on the executive branch, explicit: "As Commander-in-
Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to order interroga-
tions of enemy combatants," and "Congress may no more regulate the
President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it
may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield." 100
The memo further argues that the "President enjoys complete discretion
in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting
operations against hostile forces." 101 The Yoo Memo repeats these
claims in the specific context of the President's power to order "harsh
interrogations" or torture: "Just as statutes that order the President to
conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be uncon-
stitutional, so too are laws that would prevent the President from gaining
the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United
States. ' 10 2 According to the President, federal courts also lack authority
to review and regulate the exercise of his discretion in this area.10 3 On
this view, Congress, courts, and citizens should all defer to unfettered ex-
ecutive action taken as necessary to protect national security.10 4 Such
"necessary" actions may include indefinite detentions as well as torture-
actions justified by the power to act as circumstances require.10 5 Thus,
even if we find a principle of necessity at the heart of the President's
99. President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
100. Bybee Memo, supra note 24, at 31, 35.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Yoo Memo, supra note 3, at 19. The Memo also argues that "[a]ny effort by Con-
gress to regulate the interrogation of enemy combatants would violate the Constitution's
sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President." Id.
103. "However, the scope of judicial review that is available concerning the military's
determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is necessarily limited by the funda-
mental separation-of-powers concerns raised by a court's review or second-guessing of
such a core military judgment in wartime." Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 10.
104. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility-along with the
necessary power-to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation's foreign rela-
tions .... [I]t is crucial to recognize that judicial interference in these domains destroys the
purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a unitary Executive.").
105. A former head of the Office of Legal Counsel from which the Bybee Memo issued
stated that the message was clear that "violent acts aren't necessarily torture; if you do
torture, you probably have a defense; and even if you don't have a defense, the torture law
doesn't apply if you act under color of presidential authority." JACK GOLDSMITH, THE




powers under Article II, we do not avoid legal conflict with constitutional
constraints when executive action conflicts with executive duty under the
Take Care Clause. 10 6
3. Is the Judiciary Necessary?
When two political branches are in conflict, or when one of the
branches deprives individuals of constitutionally protected rights, a role
ordinarily exists for judicial review. Under the normal functioning of
constitutional checks and balances, judicial review allows judges to moni-
tor the outer limits of the political branches' enumerated powers in order
to safeguard liberty. Necessity, however, does not arise during normal
times, and the unilateral tendency of the necessity Constitution does not
envision anything more than a minimal role for the judiciary during times
of emergency. Indeed, some advocates of necessity argue on behalf of
complete judicial deference to executive decisions, even when those deci-
sions suppress other constitutional rights: "The deferential view is that
judicial review of governmental action, in the name of the Constitution,
should be relaxed or suspended during an emergency. 10 7 Moreover, ad-
vocates of the necessity Constitution such as Posner and Vermeule claim
that federal judges "are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is
no reason to expect that courts can improve upon the government's
emergency policies in any systematic way. '"108
As a version of what Cass Sunstein calls "National Security Maximal-
ism,"' 0 9 this approach claims that when it comes to maintaining the opti-
mal balance between security and liberty, the executive has the
institutional prerogative. Although Sunstein rejects this approach, he
does advocate for judicial minimalism, "representing a kind of Due Pro-
cess Writ Large."" 0 Minimalism requires that Congress provide clear
statements authorizing executive action that intrudes on other constitu-
tional interests, that some kind of a hearing is provided before persons
are deprived of their liberty, and that courts should provide "narrow, in-
completely theorized rulings." '1
According to Sunstein, the Court has often employed minimalism
when confronting challenges to executive authority during wartime. In
Ex parte Quirin, the Court upheld the detention and trial before military
commissions of six Nazi saboteurs as enemy combatants, one of whom,
Herbert Haupt, was a U.S. citizen. 112 Avoiding the President's claim to
inherent authority to detain and try the saboteurs as enemy combatants
before military tribunals, the Court reasoned that the President was act-
106. This problem does not dissipate when presidential unilateralists defend executive
action at a higher level of abstraction.
107. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. at 31.
109. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 56.
110. Id. at 109.
111. Id.
112. 317 U.S. 1, 20, 48 (1942).
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ing within constitutional powers granted by Congress.113 Seeing in Qui-
rin a justification for detaining individuals, including citizens, as "enemy
combatants," and trying them before military commissions, the Bush Ad-
ministration argued that the Executive has the unchecked unilateral au-
thority to detain individuals, including U.S. citizens, that he deems
"enemy combatants" in the war on terror.114 The Hamdi plurality found
authority for executive action in the Authorization for Use Military
Force, subjecting the detentions only to the limited judicial check of pro-
viding detainees the due process right to contest their status.115 Sunstein
approves of this approach because it provides a minimal, under-theorized
holding that finds congressional authorization for executive action while
subjecting executive authority to minimal judicial checks. 116
The plurality in Hamdi made clear that executive unilateralism has lim-
its, even in times of purported emergency. "Whatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake. 11 7 When holding that the President's actions were lawful in
Quirin, the Court made clear that the "President, like the courts, pos-
sess[es] no power not derived from the Constitution." 118 One implication
of these cautionary notes is that the President cannot balance security
and liberty interests unmoored from congressional authorization and con-
stitutional authority. Moreover, the Court in Hamdi emphasized that
"[w]e have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."119
As the Boumediene Court explained, "[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity
to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbi-
trary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by
adherence to the separation of powers.
120
113. Id. at 30, 41-45. "We are concerned only with the question whether it is within the
constitutional power of the national government to place petitioners upon trial before a
military commission for the offenses with which they are charged." Id. at 29.
114. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 536-38 (plurality opinion). The Administration had previously argued that
the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the habeas corpus challenges of Guantanamo
detainees. The Court rejected this position, holding that federal courts had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear the detainees' claims. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
484 (2004) (plurality opinion).
116. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 101 (finding aspects of the opinion as reasoning "[i]in
good minimalist fashion").
117. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536; see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even more important than the method of selecting the people's
rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by
the rule of law."); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ("[The
war power] permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme co-
operative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitu-
tional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.").
118. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
119. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
120. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
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A significant problem with Sunstein's version of minimalism is that it is
too minimal. Sunstein would require judges to endorse the actions of the
political branches-even when significant constitutional commitments are
at stake-checked only by the requirement that some minimal amount of
due process accompany deprivations of liberty.121 Presumably, judicial
minimalism is consistent with upholding the detention of Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri, who was taken from his home in Peoria, Illinois, and has
been held as an enemy combatant on the President's order since June
2003.122 In this case, where there was an absence of any statement that
al-Marri was connected in any way to the battlefield or that he had taken
up arms against the United States, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that
"the President lacks power to order the military to seize and indefinitely
detain al-Marri. ' 123 Perhaps more in line with Sunstein's view of judicial
minimalism, the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc overturned the panel and
held that Congress had in fact authorized the President to detain al-
Marri.124 If rights against indefinite detention and practices such as harsh
interrogation are to be protected, something more than judicial minimal-
ism is required, especially when the circumstances that give rise to execu-
tive assertions of power rely as much on the rhetoric of war as the reality.
Even if Sunstein's model of minimalism at war appropriately captures the
rule of the Supreme Court during wartime, it is poorly suited to the on-
going "war on terror," dependent as it is on the rhetorical manipulation
of supposed wartime circumstances in peaceful Peoria, Illinois.12 5
More consistent with settled constitutional principles is the view that
courts play a robust role in checking the constitutional excesses of the
political branches, even under purported times of emergency. Perhaps
the background situations of Quirin and al-Marri involve occasions in
which executive authority is at its peak, but neither case presents emer-
gencies in which the full government could not function normally.
Absent a truly extraordinary situation, our constitutional culture pro-
vides two significant checks against executive threats to liberty-judicial
review and the political participation of citizens. Citizen monitoring of
executive practices of torture and indefinite detention, as well as wide-
spread refusal to consent to the dramatic changes in the constitutional
culture urged by the Administration, suggests that this check continues to
have some vitality.12 6 Although the Supreme Court found jurisdiction
121. See David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or
Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2024 (2006) (arguing that Sunstein
"permits the executive to claim that a system of arbitrary detention is one which operates
under the rule of law, but also requires judges to endorse that claim").
122. AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007).
123. Id. at 164.
124. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, No. 06-7427, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14979 (4th Cir. July
15, 2008) (en banc).
125. The Administration argued to the Fourth Circuit that Peoria is part of the newly
defined battlefield in the war on terror. Id.
126. See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Focus of Inquiry by Justice Department, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at Al.
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over Guantanamo detainees in Rasul,127 extended to detainees procedu-
ral rights to contest their designation as "enemy combatants" in
Hamdi,'28 and concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions applies to detainees in Hamdan,129 the Court has not substantively
ruled on any of the Bush Administration's contested practices in the "war
on terrorism. '130 Indeed, the Boumediene Court underscored this fact
when it observed with regard to Guantanamo detainees, "[s]ome of these
petitioners have been in custody for six years with no definitive judicial
determination as to the legality of their detention. ' 131 Even though judi-
cial review is necessary, it may not always be a robust, or timely, partici-
pant in the ongoing conversation about the shape and direction of
constitutional culture.
4. Does the Oath Clause Require Constitutional Preservation?
The problem with this Constitution of necessity is that it creates an
entirely new constitutional order-one that changes the meaning and
scope of constitutional constraints. Madison was concerned that the con-
stitutional order would be undermined if it attempted to oppose a
stronger and prior impulse to national preservation with constitutional
barriers.1 32 Solving this problem by finding within the Constitution a
consequentialist principle of necessity creates an equally troubling prob-
lem: the Constitution turns out to be a balancing act, emptying of content
the notion that constitutional provisions serve as principled constraints on
government actions, no matter the costs. This approach redefines
Madison's "necessary usurpations of power" as proper exercises of con-
stitutional balancing.1 33
It is always easier to achieve "compelling" governmental purposes if
one is permitted to act free from constitutional impediments. For exam-
ple, police work would be much easier if exigent circumstances were al-
ways presumed to exist, eliminating any remaining vestiges of principled
constraint in the face of claimed necessity. 134 Convenience, however, has
never been thought to trump principle in our constitutional tradition. As
the Supreme Court has noted, "the mere fact that law enforcement may
127. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
128. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004).
129. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-2800 (2006).
130. See generally Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 Ox-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (2006) (describing how the Supreme Court's rulings in three
cases regarding detainment of individuals for years without charging them with a crime
"badly compromised" basic constitutional principles).
131. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
132. FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 74, at 257.
133. Id.
134. For example, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court held that city road-
blocks for narcotics searches were unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment re-
quires individualized suspicion under these circumstances, reasoning that "[w]e cannot
sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interroga-
tion and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime." 531
U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
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be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment."'1 35 Moreover, "the Fourth Amendment reflects the view
of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home
and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum sim-
plicity in enforcement of the criminal law."' 136 Indeed, the very point of
opposing the constitutional principle of necessity is to channel the exer-
cise of state power within predetermined boundaries and preserve a do-
main of individual liberty free from state intrusion, even if in so doing
government officials find that accomplishing their goals and fulfilling
their duties is made more difficult.
By claiming that a constitutional principle of necessity exists in the
Presidential Oath Clause, Paulsen too quickly and too easily equates pre-
serving the Constitution with preserving the nation.137 "We the People"
ordained and established the Constitution, which the President has the
duty to preserve. "We the People" formed a political bond, withholding
particular powers and retaining particular rights from the terms of that
bond.138 To use a religious concept, the President's duty is to maintain
the sanctity of that bond, which includes the duty to protect the condi-
tions under which that bond was made possible. 39 Thus, a principle of
necessity conflicts with the ideal of maintaining fidelity to the terms of
this constitutional bond, because it purports to free the President from
the very limitations that define the bond and the constitutional culture it
fosters. The Constitution of necessity places protecting national security
over preserving the legitimating terms of that political bond. As Christo-
pher Kutz observed, "[t]he vulnerability of the people cannot be equated
with the vulnerability of the nation itself. Instead, the nation is rendered
insecure only when its identity and existence comes under siege."' 140 Ex-
istence as identity of a constitutional culture, with a particular outlook
and way of living in the political security of protected rights and con-
strained government, is precisely what cannot be preserved under a prin-
ciple of necessity that supervenes over constitutional structure.
135. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
136. Id. Writing in dissent in California v. Acevedo, Justice Stevens reiterated this
point: "Even if the warrant requirement does inconvenience the police to some extent,
that fact does not distinguish this constitutional requirement from any other procedural
protection secured by the Bill of Rights. It is merely a part of the price that our society
must pay in order to preserve its freedom." 500 U.S. 565, 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See generally Paulsen, supra note 30.
138. Both the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments make explicit this act of withholding.
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
139. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)
(noting that the U.S. Constitution "has been, virtually from the moment of its ratification,
a sacred symbol, the most potent emblem ... of the nation itself").
140. Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235,
273 (2007) (emphasis added).
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Operationally, decisions about procedures of interrogation should take
into account what it means to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States,"'1 4 1 especially in a culture-preserving manner.
It is not enough to protect national security in some abstract sense. The
notion of "national security" is poorly matched as an object to balance
against specific civil liberties such as freedom of speech, indefinite deten-
tion, or the protection of bodily integrity and dignity.142 One wants to
know what specific gains in security are to be matched against which spe-
cific losses of liberty in order to better understand in what sense a given
action serves to protect the Constitution.
In order to determine how to preserve and protect the Constitution, we
must take into account what specific decisions do to constitutional mean-
ing. Moreover, given the ways in which constitutional meaning is imbri-
cated with norms of international human rights law that also seek to
protect human dignity and integrity, we must look to how well specific
decisions pay "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."'1 43 If the
President's power is construed as being broad during times of emergency
or exigency, his duty to protect these interconnected constitutional norms
and interests is broad as well. To the extent that it is difficult for the
President to both preserve and protect the Constitution and its defining
commitments during real-world exigencies, there is a role for Congress
and courts to engage the conversation about preserving and protecting
the Constitution, its meaning, and the persons and culture it constitutes.
More than grounding a principle of necessity, the Oath Clause's lan-
guage of "preserve and protect" implies a strong emphasis on preserving
not a mere document or an abstract conception of the nation, but on pre-
serving constitutional culture-ways of ordering social and political life
which provide ways of seeing the world and enabling individuals to fulfill
the promise of liberty and pursuit of happiness.' 44 In order to vindicate
this duty to preserve the Constitution and the culture it nurtures, execu-
tive actions cannot be the product of univalent, unconstrained choices
about efficient ways to protect against physical threats to the nation.
Rather, executive decisions must take account of the constitutional cul-
ture and the Constitution-preserving implications of official action. The
Oath does not bind the President to preserve an abstract notion of "Na-
tion" or national security, but rather the principles and values the Consti-
tution articulates and the political culture of "We the People" it sustains.
The temptation, however, to privilege necessity gets expressed through
the claim that the "Constitution is not a suicide pact,' 45 an expression
141. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
142. See Crocker, Torture with Apologies, supra note 27, at 583-84.
143. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
144. See generally MICHAEL SULLIVAN, LEGAL PRAGMATISM: COMMUNITY, RIGHTS,
AND DEMOCRACY (2007).
145. This statement originates in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with
a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
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widely circulated after September 11 to bolster the idea that constitu-
tional constraints cannot stand in the way of national necessity. Under
this logic, without a secure nation, there will be no civil liberties to pro-
tect. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, "[c]ivil liberties, as guaran-
teed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestrained abuses."'1 46 While true, this claim does not sup-
port the proposition that necessity can trump principle, except perhaps in
the most dire existential crisis. Even in such circumstances, if one main-
tains fidelity to the idea of the Constitution as principled constraint
against encroachments on civil liberties, it would be better to maintain
the extra-legal status of an act intended to respond to the truly extra-
ordinary event.
To the extent that necessity overpowers principle, when we acknowl-
edge the extra-legal status of actions unconstrained by constitutional
principles, we retain the extraordinariness of the resort to necessity, if
and when it is ever justified, and keep an appropriate distance between
what is normal and what is exceptional. 147 Because a Constitution of ne-
cessity provides no clear guidance as to when the principle of necessity
trumps normal principles, we at least maintain greater conceptual clarity
by placing necessity outside the bounds of the Constitution. To do so is
not to suggest that extra-legal actions taken in the name of necessity
would be justified; it means that necessity cannot be justified within a
constitutional framework itself. Alternatively, otherwise illegal actions
could be given rule of law status by enacting quasi-constitutional statutes
of the form Bruce Ackerman has recommended, authorizing the execu-
tive to have more expansive powers over detention in the immediate
wake of a significant terrorist attack with a gradual return to normalcy
over time. 148 This solution eschews the possibility of extra-legal action,
thereby preserving core constitutional values while accommodating the
emergency situation. What is clear from the range of analytic options-a
constitutional principle of necessity, an extra-legal reliance on necessity,
or a rule of law limitation on necessity-is that the content of constitu-
pact."). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[W]hile the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."). The
phrase also forms the title of Judge Posner's most recent project explaining the necessity of
balancing away civil liberties to promote national security. See generally RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY(2006); but see David Cole, How to Skip the Constitution, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS, Nov. 16, 2006 (criticizing Posner and arguing that "[c]onstitutional theory ... de-
mands more than mere ad hoc balancing").
146. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
147. Others have explored the advantages of this approach. See e.g., Lobel, supra note
28, at 1428 ("Emergency situations.., are best addressed not by allowing broad executive
discretion, even limited temporally, but by forcing the President to respond to such emer-
gencies by openly acting unconstitutionally."); see generally Oren Gross, Are Torture War-
rants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481,
1487-89 (2004); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional? 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
148. ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 57.
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tional culture and official practice depend very much on which theoretical
framework we adopt.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF NECESSITY
If the Constitution of necessity is fraught with difficulty, what about the
practice of necessity? The practice of necessity arises on a continuum
between two separate situations. One is in response to genuine emergen-
cies. The clearest examples would be cases of rebellion or invasion when
habeas corpus could be suspended, or when a state is "actually invaded,
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,"'149 such that the
state is authorized to engage in war. The other way to practice necessity
is to use rhetoric to transform ordinary problems into exigent or emer-
gency situations. Executive discretion to act combined with enabling leg-
islation and deferential courts have created environments in which
indefinite detention, suspicionless searches, suppressed dissent, and
"harsh" interrogation or torture are all practices justified by appeal to
necessity. If an executive official can convert an ordinary, albeit signifi-
cant, problem into an exigent circumstance, the official's actions can spin
free from ordinary constitutional constraint. Given the freedom to act in
light of a compelling need, there will always be incentives and pressures
to convert problematic situations accordingly. As Justice Jackson sug-
gests, "[e]mergency powers .. .tend to kindle emergencies."' 150
Because necessity may operate without principled limits, actions which
it justifies are susceptible to repetition and normalization, often outside
the bounds of the narrowly construed exigent circumstance. Normaliza-
tion is particularly problematic when, for example, the war on terror-
which is a significant basis for claims to unconstrained executive author-
ity-"will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated."'1 51
1. Criminal Procedure
One way of normalizing necessity within law is through the creation of
exigent circumstances, where the shape of a protective constitutional
right changes to fit the "special needs" of state officials. Exigency, no less
than emergency, supports claims to act free from ordinary constitutional
constraints. When state officials assert exigent circumstances, courts bal-
ance the asserted need against the liberty implicated by that need. This
practice is most visible in the development of "exigent circumstance" ex-
ceptions to criminal procedure principles. 152
149. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
151. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html.
152. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
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Ordinarily, suspicionless searches of individuals are prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. a53 In order to have authority to conduct searches of
persons or places, state officials must obtain a warrant from a neutral
magistrate legitimated by the requisite individualized suspicion. 154 Ex-
ceptions abound for this requirement. One line of cases illustrates the
way in which an assertion of exigent circumstances in one situation
spreads to others, creating a constitutional climate in which the governing
principle begins to look more like the exception. For example, the Su-
preme Court has carved out a "special needs" exception to the ordinary
Fourth Amendment warrant backed by probable clause. 155 Responding
to a perceived compelling state need, the Court authorized border patrol
agents to conduct suspicionless searches of cars for illegal aliens near the
Mexican border.' 56 Having established the exception by accommodating
claims of necessity, similar claims to a special need now include highway
sobriety checkpoints, 157 checkpoints for information gathering, 158 drug
testing of student athletes, 159 and, most recently, random searches of bags
in the New York subway system.160 In each case, the special need is justi-
fied by circumstances that purport to make necessary the searches and
temporary seizures employed by state officials.
Judicial authorization for the New York Subway searches raises the
most troubling questions. The Second Circuit engaged in a balancing test
in which the liberty interest never made an appearance.161 Rather, the
court reasoned by analogy from existing practices of airport searches, ac-
cepting without question the assertions made by law enforcement officials
concerning the need for random searches. 162 The court justified the pro-
gram of random searches by noting that "[w]e have no doubt that con-
cealed explosives are a hidden hazard, that the Program's purpose is
prophylactic, and that the nation's busiest subway system implicates the
public's safety. Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the sub-
ways constitutes a special need."'1 63 Here, officials asserted that the
searches were necessary in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Using the
threat of terrorism is like playing a necessity trump card. Combining the
current climate of the "war on terror" with the availability of the "special
need" exception, the Second Circuit was unwilling to oppose constitu-
153. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
154. Id.
155. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only
in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.").
156. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545, 551-53 (1976).
157. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
158. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2004).
159. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995).
160. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).
161. Id. at 271-73.
162. Id. at 270.
163. Id. at 271.
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tional principle to claims of state necessity. 164
What is significant about this line of cases is the way in which a "special
need" in one circumstance spreads to others. We move by accretive
creep from a point of specific "special need" to a general "special need."
What was special becomes normal. We thus begin to see the world in
terms of terrorist threats and regular, suspicionless searches. The Katz
doctrine provides that the Fourth Amendment protects expectations of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 165 When the
incremental growth of "special need" exceptions leads to suspicionless
searches of pedestrians on sidewalks in urban centers, claims to a privacy
right to be "left alone '166 will merit constitutional protection only to the
extent that citizens and courts are willing to recognize the right as reason-
able in light of the circumstances. In this manner, necessity gives rise to
"special needs" that alter official practices and produce different cultural
expectations, which in turn transform the nature and scope of constitu-
tional protections. As necessity becomes normal in some defined sphere,
altered practices give rise to changed constitutional culture.
2. War on Terror
In the wake of new challenges posed by terrorist threats, states will be
sorely tempted to normalize practices of necessity. In responding to the
threats posed by the September 11 attacks, U.S. officials have detained
and interrogated thousands of persons at home and abroad. 167 The U.S.
has labeled detained captured Taliban fighters and suspected al Qaeda
members "enemy combatants" and attempted to avoid legal obligations
imposed by the Geneva Conventions for the treatment of detainees and
to circumvent domestic judicial jurisdiction. 16 In so doing, officials have
also sought to loosen, if not lift, the norm against engaging in torture.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") operated under a binding legal
opinion that severely limited what actions could count as torture under
U.S. law to those that caused "intense pain or suffering of the kind that is
equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical in-
jury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in
164. See id.
165. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
166. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the "makers of our Constitution," "conferred, as against the government, the
right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.").
167. Edward Wong, American Jails in Iraq Are Bursting with Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2005, at Al; see also Warren Hoge, Investigators for U.N. Urge U.S. to Close Guan-
tanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (reporting that "only 45 percent of the prisoners
have committed a hostile act against the United States or its allies, and that only 8 percent
have been classified as Qaeda fighters").
168. Amnesty International "believes in their totality [that these conditions of detain-
ment] amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of international
standards." Press Release, Amnesty International, United States of America: Interna-




a loss of significant body function will likely result."' 169 As a result of the
culture created by this and other Bush Administration positions, it is
likely that "harsh interrogation" or torture in violation of international
and domestic law has not been confined to the extraordinary occasion.'
70
Presenting a factual accounting of some of what is known about practices
seemingly authorized by the DOJ is certainly a moving target, as new
revelations arise regularly.
Troubling aspects of official culture surrounding questionable deten-
tion and interrogation practices began shortly after September 11. Re-
ports of "stress and duress" techniques employed by U.S. officials and the
statements by former detainees about the conditions of interrogation at
the U.S. base at Bagram, Afghanistan indicate a consistent attempt to
explore, if not exceed, the outer limits of what is legally permitted. Offi-
cials have described their techniques as "not quite torture, but about as
close as you can get.' 71 Porter Goss, director of the C.I.A., described
"waterboarding" as an approach that falls within "an area of what I call
professional interrogation techniques" and further defended these inter-
rogation techniques as successful in preventing terrorist attacks. 172 Un-
derscoring the role of necessity arguments, one official stated: "If you
don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably
aren't doing your job."'1 73 Detainees have described some of the interro-
gation techniques as including being kept standing or kneeling for hours
wearing black hoods, being kept in awkward or painful positions, and
being deprived of sleep under twenty-four hour bright lights.174 Abdul
Jabar and Hakkim Shah report being forced to stand naked and immobile
while being hooded and shackled.' 75 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the al-
leged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, was repeatedly subjected to
"waterboarding" during interrogation.1 76 At least two deaths caused by
"blunt force injuries" at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan have been in-
vestigated and ruled as "homicides.Il 77 Interrogators withheld pain medi-
cation from Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking al Qaeda leader, who was
169. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 2 (Dec. 30, 2004)
(regarding "Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A") (replacing the
Bybee Memo, supra note 24) [hereinafter "Levin Memo"].
170. Tapes destroyed.
171. Don Van Natta, Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World, NY
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 14.
172. Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2005, at Al.
173. Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
174. Id.
175. Carlotta Gall, U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody, NY TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2003, at A14.
176. Mark Mazzetti & Margot Williams, In Tribunal Statement, Confessed Plotter of
September 11 Burnishes Image as a Soldier. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A15.




shot several times when he was captured. 178 And John Walker Lindh
complained of not being treated for a gunshot wound and being kept na-
ked and bound to a stretcher with duct tape-what his lawyer described
as "torturous conditions. ' 179 In addition to the U.S. practices of interro-
gation at Bagram and elsewhere, the U.S. has reportedly been turning
over suspects for interrogation in countries known for their use of tor-
ture, in violation of our obligations under the Convention Against Tor-
ture 180 which protects persons from being transported to other states to
be tortured. 181 Finally, troubling U.S. practices became most visible
through the photographs depicting abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq.
The developed picture of official actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and else-
where is that the line has been crossed in official U.S. practice from coer-
cive interrogation to torture. This move is largely motivated by the
background argument of necessity: if we do not act aggressively, if we do
not push the acceptable limits of interrogation and follow the letter and
spirit of the norm against torture, we will not have sufficiently protected
ourselves from possible future attacks. As one U.S. official commented
when explaining the interrogation of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, "keep
in mind that this is a guy who was not only the mastermind of 9/11, but
was also actively involved in plotting future and ongoing terrorist opera-
tions . . . .Everyone would understand the wisdom of finding out
whatever information we can from him."' 182 The implied "by any means
necessary" in the voice of reason and normalcy challenges the full realiza-
tion of the norm against torture in practice. In fact, reports make clear
that in the face of claimed necessity, officials did not hesitate to resort to
torture. 183 Remarks like the following from Vice President Cheney exem-
plify claims to act as necessary:
Now, you can get into a debate about what shocks the conscience
and what is cruel and inhuman. And to some extent, I suppose,
that's in the eye of the beholder. But I believe, and we think it's
important to remember, that we are in a war against a group of indi-
viduals and terrorist organizations that did, in fact, slaughter 3,000
innocent Americans on 9/11, that it's important for us to be able to
have effective interrogation of these people when we capture
178. Questioning Terror Suspects, supra, note 171.
179. Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses: The Suspect; Questioning
to Be Legal, Humane and Aggressive the White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at
A13.
180. Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, at 3 ("No State Party shall expel, re-
turn ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.").
181. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordi-
nary Rendition" Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; see also Guy Dinmore,
Pressure Grows on US Rendition Policy in US Congress, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Nov.
21, 2006 (reporting "the case of Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, who was seized [as it turns
out in error] by U.S. authorities and deported to his native Syria, where he was tortured").
182. Lichtblau & Liptak, supra note 179.




Claiming that the President had made "tough and courageous" decisions
in the war on terrorism, Mr. Cheney asserted that detention and interro-
gation programs for high level detainees had yielded "information that
has saved thousands of lives.' 1 85 In other words, the goal of saving lives
makes it necessary to employ extra-legal means, with no acknowledgment
that even necessity might require a stronger justification, and no demon-
stration that other, legal means might have proven just as effective.
Merely claiming a weak form of necessity suffices.
These arguments of executive unilateralism are not confined to prac-
tices of detention and interrogation, but also appear in the context of
domestic surveillance programs. After September 11, the administration
began intercepting communications of persons in the United States
outside of the constitutional and statutory framework established to au-
thorize and regulate such practices.' 86 Necessity now operates not at the
level of dire existential threat but at the level of electronic intelligence
gathering.
Nonetheless, executive officials defend taking such actions first on the
basis of the circumstances surrounding the aftermath of September 11,
and second on the Executive's inherent constitutional authority. Building
a case that relies on the President's authority to conduct foreign rela-
tions,187 the power to protect the nation from foreign attacks, 188 and the
power to gather foreign intelligence information, the DOJ issued a "white
paper" which argued "that the President has inherent constitutional au-
thority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.' 1 89 Given the barrier
that the standing doctrine creates for individuals challenging the constitu-
tionality of the program, judicial review will be difficult to obtain, with
the consequence that the political process and public pressure are the
184. Nightline: Cheney Roars Back (ABC television broadcast Dec. 19, 2005), excerpt
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=1419206 (interview by
Terry Moran with Vice President Dick Cheney); see also Dan Eggen, Cheney's Remarks
Fuel Torture Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2006, at A9 (discussing the Vice President's
remarks that a "dunk in water" is a no-brainer).
185. Scott Shane, C.I.A. Chief Doubts Tactic to Interrogate Is Still Legal, N.Y. TiMES,
Feb. 8, 2008, at A9.
186. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862
(2000); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-315,
82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000)). See James Risen and
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NY TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at
Al.
187. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations.").
188. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) ("If a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force
by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting
for any special legislative authority.").
189. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President 7 (2006) [hereinafter White Paper].
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remaining checks on executive claims to necessity. 190 Without delving
into the merits of the President's argument, it is enough to recognize that
the same kinds of arguments purporting to find inherent authority to act
as necessary in light of the circumstances continue to circulate as a com-
peting vision of constitutional culture. This vision is one that would au-
thorize actions taken free from normal constitutional constraint in the
name of doing whatever is necessary to ensure national security, even at
the expense of liberty or other cherished constitutional values.191
3. Conflicting Constitutional Visions
It seems clear that an alternative vision of constitutional structure and
practice is being offered. 192 In federal court filings, DOJ memos, and
papers, the executive branch has advanced a theory of unchecked unilat-
eral authority to act as necessary in conducting the "war on terror." At
stake is not only a revisionary view of the separation of powers, but also a
revisionary view of the constitutional culture nurtured through protection
of individual liberty and sustained through a particular practice of sepa-
rated and balanced powers. The issue is not that we cannot adopt such a
view, but whether we should. It seems that, under an attempt to embed
an alternate vision of executive power, "[e]mergency has become its own
purpose and justification. 1 193 Under purported conditions of emergency,
circumstances have provided the occasion to implement a theory in
practice. 194
Once we embed certain practices within our governing institutions, we
may alter our principles to accommodate the practice. Advocates of def-
erence to executive action that balances security against liberty would ar-
gue that if these practices improve security, then there cannot be a
problem. On this view, the goal of executive decision-making is to main-
tain an optimal balance between liberty and security, and sometimes
rights have to be suppressed in the name of security. In response, it is
important to note that changes in practice and principle can change our
overall political and moral outlook. Whatever its content, this outlook is
190. After several academics, journalists, and lawyers, challenged the constitutionality
of the NSA national surveillance program, a district court judge ruled that the program
was unconstitutional based on violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. The Sixth
Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demon-
strate that they had actually been targets of the surveillance program. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 687 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008).
191. The DOJ White Paper articulates the general point: "The President has the chief
responsibility under the Constitution to protect America from attack, and the Constitution
gives the President the authority necessary to fulfill that solemn responsibility." See White
Paper, supra note 189, at 1.
192. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H,. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1553 (1992).
193. William E. Scheuerman, Time to Look Abroad? The Legal Regulation of Emer-
gency Powers, 40 GA. L. REV. 863, 874 (2006).
194. For example, it was revealed that the DOJ had model legislation, Patriot III, ready
if circumstances were to change the political climate.
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comprised of the things we value, as well as the ways in which we order
our lives in light of what we value.
We are at risk of changing our culture, perhaps in dramatic ways, when
we alter our principles to condone torture. Some amount of change is no
doubt inevitable, and one would be unjustifiably inflexible to always insist
on the status quo. There are some changes, however, that we should re-
ject because they affront and disrupt the constitutional culture that we
have striven to protect in light of the principles and practices that give it
life. Moreover, some changes are problematic because they alter the
scope and application of principles based on practices adopted in reaction
to perceived circumstances. Changes such as the NSA surveillance pro-
gram, indefinite detention of persons designated "enemy combatants,"
and torture or "harsh interrogation" practices are all changes wrought in
response to the new "war on terror." The shape of constitutional con-
straint and practice can be changed through a broad national consensus;
when we do so, however, we should expect the changes to be based on
principle and to be the product of reflective reasoning.
Fundamental changes in constitutional practice should not be the prod-
uct of unilateral ad hoc balancing decisions made in immediate response
to perceived circumstances. As Justice Kennedy argued in concurrence in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,195 "[r]espect for laws derived from the customary
operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assur-
ance of stability in time of crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by
reliance on standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of
the moment.' 1 96 Nor should fundamental changes be in immediate re-
sponse to real or perceived threats, given the risk of making decisions
based on fear or even hysteria. Instead, far-reaching changes in principle
and practice should include as many institutional actors as possible who
are all engaged in reflective deliberation. To the extent that executive
officials feel the pull of necessity to act unilaterally outside of constitu-
tional constraint, concerned publics must reinvigorate the conversation
about our constitutional commitments and how they form and nurture
our culture, providing a counterweight of principled constraint to aid offi-
cials in resisting temptation to act on necessity alone. 197 Necessity will
nonetheless remain most tempting in extreme cases implicating either the
existential survival of the state, or the prospect of massive numbers of
casualties. The ticking bomb is the paradigm case used to justify necessity
in these extreme cases.
195. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
196. Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047
(2004) (confronting the problem of emergencies by proposing a "supermajoritarian escala-




III. NECESSITY ARGUMENTS: JUSTIFICATION AND SCOPE
At the limit of constitutional principle and ordinary practice we con-
front the possibility of existential threats so dire that executive officials
must make decisions in uncharted terrain. In order to explore this ter-
rain, we must rely on our imagination, since genuine historical examples,
as we have seen, are difficult to find. Imagination, as it turns out, has
seemingly been more than adequate, weaving together any number of
variations on a simple "ticking bomb" hypothetical. 198 As I shall argue,
because of the inherent limitations on imagination in this context, there is
no way to say hypothetically what should be done in a future emergency
situation. Real emergencies don't come neatly emplotted in the form of
the simple ticking bomb story. Because circumstances and consequences
are so complex in the actual world, imagining the simple story fails to tell
us much, ex ante, about what we should do in actual practice. The prob-
lem is not that we cannot imagine fantastical hypothetical situations, but
that we cannot imagine the institutional and cultural consequences of act-
ing in the everyday world. When we justify torture in the simple case, I
argue that we also justify torture in more complex cases, though this fact
remains hidden from our imagination.
A. SOMEWHERE A BOMB IS TICKING
The standard argument from necessity presupposes that harm may be
done to a specific person when necessary to protect many people from
death. We need not be concerned with the precise number of people,
because the justification for perpetrating the harm does not turn on the
size of the harm to be prevented, so long as the harm prevented would be
greater than the harm perpetrated. 199 To be sure, the ticking bomb sce-
nario works best when we imagine a whole city, with perhaps hundreds of
thousands of potential victims. In each case, what is advanced is a justifi-
cation for engaging in torture on consequentialist grounds. The undesir-
able consequences make the harm of torture both preventative and
necessary. Officials torture because they must. Officials torture in order
to prevent harm even greater than that perpetrated by the torture.
Notice three things: First, the justification for imposing the harm of
torture is only incidentally related to a particular person. Second, the
scope of the harm imposed is not bound to a particular person. Third, the
hypothetical requires an imaginative commitment to the logic of necessity
and a suspension of normal rules.
First, as to the justification for torture in the ticking bomb case, if P is
the person believed to have planted the bomb or is otherwise believed to
know where the bomb is located, and if there were no other means within
198. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 140 (2002); BOB
BRECHER, TORTURE AND THE TICKING BOMB 1 (2007); Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 124, 142-43 (1978).




the temporal limitations of the potentially catastrophic situation to obtain
the information, then officials would be justified in torturing P-not for
purposes of punishment, official terror, or sadism, but merely for infor-
mational purposes. It is the information that officials seek, not the suffer-
ing of P. Officials are not attempting to mete out just punishment to
adjudged guilt. To justify the suffering of P in itself, by torture or other
means, we would have to provide reasons based on retribution, restitu-
tion, rehabilitation, or some other justification for punishing P in particu-
lar in light of other normative commitments. But in the present scenario,
we are not interested in punishment or the suffering of P, but the revela-
tion of information that officials think is hidden in the mind of P. The
location of the information necessary to save the lives of thousands is
only contingently related to p.200 As such, if there were other means of
compelling P to reveal the information, those means would be equally
justified. Moreover, if there were other means to obtain the information
that did not involve harm to P, officials would no longer be justified in
resorting to torture.
As others have noted, the power of the justificatory intuition relies on
the art and asceticism of the standard hypothetical-a bomb and a sus-
pect who knows where it is. 2° 1 Imagine the standard ticking bomb scena-
rio, but add to the scenario a suspect who has an unusually high tolerance
for pain. Remember, the bomb is ticking, and we do not have a lot of
time to wear down his defenses. Officials do know, however, that he is
particularly fond of his two daughters, aged nine and ten.20 2 In their
desperation to prevent catastrophe, officials have detained the suspect's
family. "Waterboarding" does not immediately work, and officials do not
want to push the limits, lest they accidentally drown the suspect. Needles
under the fingernails do not immediately work, nor does the blowtorch (a
sadistic device apparently employed by Saddam Hussein).20 3 Then the
loathsome idea arises-after failing to respond to the usual methods,
would the suspect respond to the threatened or actual torture of one or
200. By contrast, when we make judgments of guilt, it is highly relevant that the personjudged guilty be the same person on whom we impose punishment.
201. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1440-44 (2005).
202. See JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE 92 (2000) (describ-
ing practices of torturing children to get relatives to talk).
203. Hussein's torture methods included: "branding, electric shocks administered to
the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of fingernails, burning with hot irons, and
blowtorches, suspension from rotating ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, break-ing of limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and ex-
tremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family members and
relatives." See White House, A Decade of Deception and Defiance (2002), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraqdecade.pdf (quoted in Harold Hongju Koh, Can
the President be Torturer in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1150 (2006)). The blowtorch is not
alien in American usage either, but was used in a widely reported lynching in Duck Hill,
Mississippi in 1936. See Lynchers Torture, Burn Two Negroes; Mississippi Mob Takes the
Prisoners From Officers Outside of Court House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1937, at 52.
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both of his daughters?2 0 4 Would officials be justified in perpetrating such
harm? Under the standard justification relying on necessity arguments,
the answer must be "yes."
20 5
Recall, first, that the justification for torture is only incidentally related
to the particular person. We want the information to prevent the catas-
trophe, we do not desire the torture of the particular person in and of
itself for ends such as criminal justice or projecting state power. Moreo-
ver, the justificatory intuition depends on the proposition that a "little"
loathsome harm is justified by the greater good achieved. This proposi-
tion combines the intuitions of both the "lesser evil"'20 6 and the "dirty
hands" arguments. 20 7 Thus, if obtaining information from P requires the
harm of another person, then that harm would also be justified. 20 8 Imag-
ine then a scenario in which P is made to talk because agents torture his
ten-year-old daughter. However repulsive it may be, the torture of his
daughter would be justified under the standard argument. Many lives
would be saved, it was always within P's power to prevent the harm by
simply talking, and the justification for torture as a means to obtaining
information is not person-specific. The same justificatory logic applies to
torturing the suspect's daughters as it does in the standard case, because
in neither case is the torture connected to P in any particular way other
than as a means of obtaining the desired information that P can provide.
As the torture of additional family members also illustrates, the scope
of the harm justified is not necessarily narrowly circumscribed. Thus, the
second point to observe is that just as torture justified by necessity need
not be person specific, it need not be narrowly circumscribed. The stan-
dard justification need not impose clearly bounded constraints on the
scope of the harm or the number of individuals tortured in order to ob-
204. Such a possibility is all the more realistic when we confront the reality that tortur-
ers are ends-driven and obedient to authority. See Jessica Wolfendale, Training Torturers:
A Critique of the "Ticking Bomb" Argument, 32 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 269, 287 (2006)
("The ticking bomb scenario requires a torturer desensitized to the infliction and endur-
ance of suffering, trained to dehumanize the victims of torture, and who will obey orders
without question.").
205. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 191 ("The legal system should author-
ize coercive interrogation in some narrow range of circumstances, suitably defined and
regulated ex ante."). See also Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3 (Sa-
muel Scheffler ed., 1988) (considering such a scenario of torturing a child, and concluding
that "utilitarianism seems to imply not only that you may but that you must torture the
child").
206. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EvIL 140-41 (2004).
207. Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 61
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2005). See also John T. Parry and Welsh S. White, Interrogating
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option? 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 743, 763-65 (2002)
(arguing for the availability of necessity defense when torture provides the last remaining
chance to save lives in imminent danger).
208. Notice that the Convention Against Torture contemplates in its definition of tor-
ture action taken against third persons. Torture includes "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed ....
Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, art. 2(1)-(2).
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tain the required information. Imagine a variation of the standard case, a
variation that may even be more realistic. Instead of having in custody a
single individual whom officials have good reason to believe knows where
the bomb is located, officials have one hundred individuals (the example
works just as well if we imagine several hundred). They know that one,
and only one, of the individuals can identify where the bomb is located,
but they do not know which person among the one hundred knows. If the
clock is ticking, then officials would claim that it is necessary to torture all
of them simultaneously. Would they be justified in torturing all one hun-
dred, or more, persons? Under the logic of the standard justification, the
answer must be "yes. '209
The logic of the ticking bomb scenario tempts us to confuse punish-
ment and desert with justifications for torture. The scenario presupposes
that the person to be interrogated is already suspicious, and, if not actu-
ally guilty of participating in acts intended to bring harm to us, is at least
knowledgeable about such acts or the planning of such acts by others.
Therefore, the individual is guilty by association with other persons who
do actually intend us harm, and, therefore, we need not lose any sleep
over this individual's torture. 210 He deserves it.
This story makes moral comfort with torture too easy. Thus, it is im-
portant to recognize that there is nothing about the claim of necessity
that distinguishes the easy from the more complex story. We can easily
imagine a more robust version of the hypothetical involving the torture of
many persons that would more readily induce moral discomfort.211
Under the logic of necessity, surely a "little" harm, torture of a group of
people with later apologies, is justified to avert a much greater catastro-
phe-the deaths of many thousands, or even millions. After all, the clock
is ticking. Because the necessity argument relies for its justification on
209. Having introduced the ticking bomb hypothetical, the variations multiply. See,
e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD
REV. 15 (1967), reprinted in MORAL PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL Es-
SAYS 63 (James Rachels ed., Harper & Row 1971) (1967); see also Judith Thompson, The
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-1401 (1985); Bernard Williams, A Critique of
Utilitarianism, in J.J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 75, 93 (1973) (noting that when we do consequentialist counting, we "will have
something to say even on the difference between massacring seven million, and massacring
seven million and one"); Moore, supra note 199, at 332. I do not seek to resolve moral
debates between consequentialists and their critics through refinement of the hypothetical.
My purpose is to examine the structure of justification, the logic of necessity, employed in
both hypothetical and real-world circumstances. For other uses of the hypothetical, see
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440(2005); Louis Michael Seidman, Torture's Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 892 (2005).
210. Penalizing "guilt by association" through laws prohibiting "material support" for
terrorists has become a new strategy in the "war on terror." See David Cole, The New
McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARE. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1,
10 (2003) ("The material support law is a classic instance of guilt by association. It imposes
liability regardless of an individual's own intentions or purposes, based solely on the indi-
vidual's connection to others who have committed illegal acts.").
211. For example, imagine a story in which officials knew that someone attending a
large wedding knew the location of the bomb. Disrupting the wedding and resorting to
torture of attendees of the party would be justified as necessity required.
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weighing the harm to be prevented against the harm perpetrated, the pos-
sibility of torturing large numbers of individuals to find the one person
who can provide the necessary information is justified. The scope of the
harm imposed is therefore not merely limited to the person thought to
have information, but extends outwards to groups of individuals in which
there is a high probability that one of them has the desired information.
B. THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION
What is interesting about the scope of harm justified by necessity is that
it affirms a situation frequently cited as a reason against allowing torture
in the first place. Critics of torture argue that abuses, such as those per-
petrated against prisoners at Abu Ghraib, are examples of why, as a prac-
tice, we should not engage in torture.212 Once permitted, torture is not
easily controlled, and it will quickly spread, creating a more pervasive
practice of official torture. 213 Consequentialists respond to this point by
observing that such arguments are about the negative consequences of
the practice of torture, not any principled limitations. 21 4 If the scope of
harm must increase, that is only because the scope of potential catastro-
phe has increased. In the consequentialist's hands, torture will be prac-
ticed more or less widely as circumstances prescribe.21 5 According to
critics, the problem is that circumstances are malleable, and, as in the case
of Abu Ghraib, torture will be practiced in situations far removed from
the "ticking bomb." In this exchange, however, consequentialists and
critics agree that under the logic of necessity, the scope of harm perpe-
trated is not tethered to the particularity of the person thought to have
the needed information.
The third aspect of necessity derived from the ticking bomb hypotheti-
cal, and its real-world counterparts, is that if we rely on our imagination
to say that we would justify torture in the simple case, then we commit
ourselves to torture in the more complex cases. When we imagine the
one case, we commit ourselves to the others, though perhaps, as with
other kinds of tragic choices, we hide this commitment from ourselves.
What we seek to imagine is a world free from torture and other barbarity,
except perhaps in the emergency situation in which the greater barbarity
would be to not torture. Imagination only partially illuminates, for we do
not contemplate the institutional and cultural consequences of embed-
ding a justification of torture. When we do so, we shift principled and
constitutional meanings that frame the relations between persons and
212. See e.g., Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1271
(2005); DANNER, supra note 5, at 23-24.
213. "Any judgment that torture could be sanctioned in an isolated case without seri-
ously weakening existing inhibitions against the more general use of torture rests on empir-
ical hypotheses about the psychology and politics of torture. There is considerable
evidence of all torture's metastatic tendency." Shue, supra note 5, at 142-43.
214. POSNER & VERMUELE, supra note 21, at 200-03.
215. Posner & Vermeule argue on consequentialist grounds that torture should be al-
lowed. "[T]he best presumption is that coercive interrogation... will be used, or not used,
as circumstances warrant." Id. at 203.
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government power in ways that our imaginations do not make readily
apparent.
As soon as we announce in advance the justifying principle of necessity
based on the ticking bomb hypothetical, every official with a terrorist-
suspect in custody will have to ask himself whether he ought to torture. 216
After all, when the suspect is in custody, it may be the case that the sus-
pect has information about an impending attack in which thousands of
lives may be at stake. Thus, once officials rely on imagination to justify
the practice, at least in emergency situations, officials are bound by their
imagination in all situations. The gap between what they imagine might
be possible, and what they actually know will always require them to con-
sider the question of torture in any given case. Imagination therefore has
perverse impacts in practice. Following their imagination, officials must
now consider the question of torture, not as a hypothetical, but as an
omnipresent, pressing question.
I do not seek to wring ever more subtle and competing moral intuitions
from further hypothetical refinements of imagined ticking bomb scena-
rios. By exploring the tenor of such hypothetical considerations, I mean
to contrast, on the one hand, the monstrosity of commitment to principle
in the face of extreme consequences with the monstrosity of commitment
to consequences, no matter how terrible the act, on the other.217 Rather
than engage our moral intuitions, I am suggesting that the "official" justi-
fications, which start small, know no boundaries, precisely because neces-
sity is unbounded by the rule of law. Richard Posner explains necessity's
status in relation to presidential suspension of habeas corpus: "justifica-
tion for it must be sought in a 'law of necessity' understood not as law but
as the trumping of law by necessity. 12 18 The "trumping" function of ne-
cessity is one that removes the justification for action outside the ordinary
constraints of law. 219 By speaking of this exceptional situation as itself
the "law of necessity," one contemplates the "logic of necessity." That is,
actions unconstrained by considerations of law or morality, but fully de-
termined by perceived circumstances, and justified by appeal to necessity.
What the necessity Constitution and the ticking bomb hypothetical
show is the fragility of goodness.220 We can imagine circumstances in
which our identity-constitutive, deeply-held beliefs come into conflict
216. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide Cases, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29-30.
217. There may be no morally acceptable common frame in which to resolve this di-
lemma. See Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PuB. Ai'. 123, 143-44 (1972).
218. POSNER, supra note 84, at 158.
219. Posner suggests: "Even torture may sometimes be justified in the struggle against
terrorism, but it should not be considered legally justified. A recurrent theme.., is that a
nonlegal law of necessity that would furnish a moral and political but not legal justification
for acting in contravention of the Constitution may trump constitutional rights in extreme
circumstances." Id. at 12.
220. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHics IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (1986).
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with basic existential necessity. 221 Then we must choose. We can choose
death over slavery, or we can choose to forego cherished principles for
survival. But what we should not do is to efface the tragedy of the choice.
We lose something in making the choice, but unlike other "tragic
choices" 222 we lose even more if we normalize the choice, blinding our-
selves to its tragic character.
IV. NECESSITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Necessity justifies too much. Once we are outside the bounds of ordi-
nary legal and constitutional constraints-in the domain of "necessity's
law"-if the torture of an indefinite number of individuals is permissible,
then it would seem that anything and everything is licensed by the emer-
gency situation. Necessity requires only that officials act to achieve secur-
ity ends; the means depend only upon their effectiveness in bringing
about what necessity requires.
A problem here is that we create a culture circumstantially committed
to its principles. One need not be so committed to the rule of law that
one rigidly adheres to the principle, fiat justitia, ruat coelum ("let justice
be done, though the heavens fall"), in order to recognize the way in which
the argument from necessity demonstrates the utter contingency of liber-
alism's deepest commitments. No doubt, in the United States many con-
stitutional rights are subject to state derogations on an appropriate
showing of sufficient need. One safeguard of judicially recognized dero-
gations from constitutional rights is that the government must justify its
specific need along a continuum from rational to compelling reasons, and
it must justify its means on a continuum from reasonably related to nar-
rowly tailored. Even if constitutional law has a specifically "dynamic
character," as thorough-going consequentialists, such as Judge Richard
Posner, suggest,2 23 especially on the margins or in the "penumbra" of a
constitutional right, it does not follow that there are not fixed points of
reference-core meanings-regarding the scope of constitutional rights.
Military conscription and aggressive questioning are one thing, slavery
and torture are quite another.
At this point, Jeremy Waldron has argued that the prohibition against
torture operates as what he calls a "legal archetype. '224 The prohibition
against torture "sums up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, princi-
ple, or policy of a whole area of law,"'2 25 in which we express our funda-
221. In such situations, "[i]n theory, we can admit an exception to an otherwise univer-
sal prohibition without undermining the values that gave rise to that prohibition." John T.
Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 160 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2005).
222. See GuiDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-18 (1978).
223. See generally POSNER, supra note 84; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM,
AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
224. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1722-23 (2005).
225. Id. at 1723.
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
mental belief that "[l]aw is not brutal in its operation. Law is not savage.
Law does not rule through abject fear and terror, or by breaking the will
of those whom it confronts. 2 26 Waldron's point illustrates how one legal
rule can be so centrally embedded within a larger system of law that to
derogate from that rule calls into question the operation of many others.
As another legal archetype, Brown v. Board of Education22 7 stands as "an
icon of the law's commitment to demolish the structures of de jure (and
perhaps also de facto) segregation. ' 228 The civil rights movement and
continuing claims seeking to obtain racial redress and eliminate the last
vestiges of segregation in society all seek to fulfill the promise of Brown.
To call Brown into question would be to call into question the entire tra-
jectory of this social movement and body of law. 22 9
Likewise, to permit the practice of torture would call into question
many other rules against forms of state-sanctioned cruelty. To put the
point in due process language, for the state to engage in torture is "to
violate a principle of justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. ' 230 To arrive at this conclu-
sion regarding the fundamental nature of the prohibition against official
torture, the Supreme Court has confronted a plethora of abuses by state
officials against human dignity and decency. For example, in due process
cases such as Brown v. Mississippi231 and Moore v. Dempsey,2 32 the Su-
preme Court addressed systematic denials of basic human dignity to Afri-
can-American criminal suspects through state use of torture and mob-
dominated trials. Through a sustained effort over a number of cases and
across a spectrum of constitutional protections, the Court has articulated
basic principles of human dignity, integrity, and autonomy tied to the
avoidance of state-imposed cruelty.233 For example, regarding the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court
explained:
It grows out of the high sentiment and regard of our jurisprudence
for conducting criminal trials and investigatory proceedings upon a
226. Id. at 1726.
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
228. Waldron, supra note 224, at 1725; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 111 (1977) (noting that precedents also work when "the earlier decision exerts
a gravitational force on later decisions even when these later decisions lie outside its partic-
ular orbit").
229. But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2760 (2007) ("Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of
race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents and our Nation's history of using
race in public schools.").
230. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal citations omitted).
231. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
232. 262 U.S. 86 (1923).
233. In the Eighth Amendment context of cruel punishment, "in regard to 'handcuffing
inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of time' and other such punishments,"
Justice Stevens emphasized "that 'we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
these forms of corporal punishment run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, offend contem-
porary concepts of decency, human dignity, and precepts of civilization which we profess to
possess." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 n.6 (2002).
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plane of dignity, humanity and impartiality. It is designed to prevent
the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individ-
ual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him to produce
and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might in-
criminate him. Physical torture and other less violent but equally
reprehensible modes of compelling the production of incriminating
evidence are thereby avoided. The prosecutors are forced to search
for independent evidence instead of relying upon proof extracted
from individuals by force of law.234
Similarly, regarding the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, the Court
explained that the Framers "feared the imposition of torture and other
cruel punishments. '235 Through these and other articulations of the im-
portance of human dignity free from state abuse, the Court places the
prohibition against torture at the foundation of our constitutional culture.
To erode these constitutional commitments under the guise of state ne-
cessity is to loosen deeply embedded limitations on state power over indi-
viduals. These limitations are essential to preserving not just liberty, but
also human dignity and decency, which are all key components of our
constitutional culture.
As I have suggested, necessity justifies too much. Waldron is correct to
argue that certain laws, such as the prohibition against torture, are em-
blematic of how we see the world.23 6 Likewise, due process values make
clear that some actions, such as torture, undermine fundamental rules
that lie at the base of all civilization, a violation of which is to undermine
"the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.237 Necessity exceeds
the values of our prevailing constitutional culture in two additional ways.
Necessity fails to recognize the existence of a limited number of non-
derogable rights, and undermines the relation between the state and per-
sons, upon which the legitimacy of the state relies.
A. NON-DEROGATION AND DIGNITY
One point is that the necessity argument unravels the tension between
rights from which derogations are permitted and those rights from which
none are allowed. For example, the state can justify restrictions on
speech by showing a substantial government need and narrow tailoring of
the means to fulfill that need.2 38 This confines any attempt by the state to
justify regulations of speech into an existing script, a public narrative in
which particular kinds of reasons must be provided and particular kinds
of public acceptances become possible.239 We understand that in order to
234. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
235. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977).
236. Waldron, supra note 1, at 1683.
237. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
238. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (applying intermediate scru-
tiny to content-neutral restrictions on speech).
239. Justifications for regulating speech also depend on the circumstances, as the Su-
preme Court has regularly been more solicitous during times of emergency. Justice
Holmes made this point clear. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
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avoid cacophony in the public sphere, the state can regulate the time and
place of speech by appealing to the need to maintain public order, not by
appealing to disapproval of message and viewpoint.240 Under such cir-
cumstances, a court reviewing competing claims by the individual and the
state engages in a process of balancing state need against individual lib-
erty. Balancing has the ring of familiarity.2 41 Courts frequently employ
"balancing tests" when there are competing interests construed as a con-
flict between individual right and state need. 242 In the context of the
"war on terror," the Court in Hamdi turned to this familiar test to estab-
lish limits to the President's unilateral power to detain individuals de-
clared to be enemy combatants. 243
In contrast to those rights and liberties properly subject to constitu-
tional balance, no amount of compelling need can justify derogations
from some rights. For example, an individual cannot be drawn and quar-
tered, no matter how compelling the state's argument in support of im-
posing such punishment. Nor can the state violate bodily integrity in
particular ways. As Justice Frankfurter said regarding the forcible re-
moval of evidence from a suspect's stomach, "[n]othing would be more
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a soci-
ety."'244 "They are methods too close to the rack and the screw. '245 If a
punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, that is
the end of the story.246 A state can punish under due process, but there is
no "compelling need" exception that would permit cruel punishments.
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
240. See e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasizing that
regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve
legitimate government interest).
241. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 1004 (1987) (discussing the history and theory behind balancing, and concluding
that "[s]evere problems beset balancing approaches to constitutional law").
242. For example, in upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, the Court
noted that "there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of
finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare."
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 393, 442 (1934).
243. The Court simply assumed the need to balance interests. "Striking the proper con-
stitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing
combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this
country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to
the principles for which we fight abroad." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). It
remains utterly unclear, however, what "our calculus" is or how to employ it.
244. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
245. Id. at 172.
246. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the shack-
ling of a person to a "hitching post" because "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment");
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) ("Proscribing torture and barbarous punishment




Using the human body in some ways and for some state purposes is sim-
ply impermissible, no matter the supposed compelling need.
After the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the imposition of
slavery is another right against which no derogations are permitted. The
prohibition against slavery is a kind of right that, if intruded upon, pro-
duces irremediable harms. To enslave someone is to destroy the underly-
ing dignity of and respect for that person on whom all constitutional
rights are grounded. To regulate speech, by contrast, is not to eliminate
it; but to enslave someone is to destroy the value of human dignity as well
as the underlying purpose of the state.24 7 Thus, while the right to free
speech is capable of incremental intrusion by important state purposes,
slavery is not a right amenable to partial protection. Accordingly, the
right to be free from slavery is a non-derogable right.248 So, too, is tor-
ture, and for similar reasons. Torture undermines the very conditions of
human dignity and bodily integrity. To be sure, the Convention Against
Torture, to which the United States is a signatory, makes clear that the
prohibition against torture is non-derogable: "No exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever ... may be invoked as a justification of torture. '249
But the expression of and commitment to non-derogation has not de-
terred the Executive from acting on necessity in ways that call into ques-
tion that commitment.
Moreover, even among those rights subject to balance, there are core
features of those rights which cannot be traded away on behalf of state
interests. 250 Even when the state may limit avenues of speech, it may not
mandate what will be orthodox in our belief. 251 If the state shuts down
the presses, it would be difficult not to conclude that a fundamental right
has been infringed, no matter the state's justification. So where the state
may be able to circumscribe press freedom in some ways, in some con-
texts, and for some compelling purposes, no balancing test would suggest
247. In her famous study of torture and the vulnerability of the human body, Elaine
Scarry suggests that "[i]ntense pain is world-destroying. In compelling confession, the tor-
turers compel the prisoner to record and objectify the fact that intense pain is world-de-
stroying." ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD 29 (1985). Scarry further observes that "[b]rutal, savage, and barbaric, torture
(even if unconsciously) self-consciously and explicitly announces its own nature as an un-
doing of civilization ..... Id. at 38.
248. See Teraya Koji, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond:
From the Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 917, 927 (2001). Other
non-derogable rights include the right to life, the right to be free from ex post facto punish-
ments, and the right to be free from torture.
249. Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, art. 2.
250. See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Mili-
tary Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407,
1422-23 (2002) (noting that "certain rights, such as the right to life and the right to be free
from torture, are expressly non-derogable, and other rights, even if not expressly non-
derogable, may nonetheless be non-derogable if they serve to protect expressly non-dero-
gable rights").
251. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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that the state can simply eliminate the press. Thus, even when rights are
subject to balance against state interests, core aspects of those rights re-
main immune to claims of purported state need.
What distinguishes derogable and non-derogable rights? Why do we
contemplate the derogation of some rights but not others? When we fo-
cus on the kinds of considerations that are relevant to justifying state in-
trusions on the absolute protection of the right, we notice that these
intrusions often function to preserve something very important about the
right in the very act of limiting it. When a court upholds a governmental
regulation of campaign finance, free speech values are protected in the
very act of limiting the channels of communication.2 5 2 Free speech is on
both sides of the equation-we limit the speech of some so that others
might be heard. 253 The overriding value is to provide political debate
with wide participation, while avoiding corrupting influences of uncon-
strained monetary contributions in the campaign process. Similarly, in
the equal protection context, government officials may employ racial
classifications when redressing the subordinating effects of other uses of
racial classifications. 254 Although a countervailing consideration runs
through Supreme Court opinions and dissents which hold that the Consti-
tution is inherently color-blind, the proposition has been generally settled
in precedent and practice that officials may cognize race under situations
designed to promote, not detract from, equality.255 In these ways, consti-
tutional rights are protected in the very act of intrusion, not as absolutes,
but in light of the very values they serve.
In other cases, officials intrude on the exercise of a protected right in
order to advance dissimilar values the state seeks to protect. Some rights
lose protection as necessity emerges in order to advance other values
such as security. When the Court licenses particular situations of police
interrogation, for example, it does so because either the intrusion on the
protected right is minimal, or because there is no genuine intrusion.
Even if there is a clash of values-the state seeks to maintain order and
public security through criminal process, the individual wishes to preserve
privacy and dignity-the state's interest is balanced against the severity of
the intrusion. So long as the intrusion is sufficiently minimal, a signifi-
cant, legitimate state interest will often override pure protection of a right
within narrowly prescribed circumstances. In criminal procedure, the cir-
cumstances of criminal investigations sometimes create exigencies, so that
rigorous respect for privacy, consent, and dignity are no longer required.
Even under exigencies, constitutional permissiveness always recognizes
252. See, e.g., McConnell v. FCC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
253. We do this in many speech contexts, despite the admonishment in Buckley v.
Valeo, that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment .... " 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
254. Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
255. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24 (2003); but see Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007).
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the values at stake, and in the Fourth Amendment context the constitu-
tional imperative of reasonableness always applies. 256 Indeed, the fact
that exigency must always be negotiated through the filter of constitu-
tional criminal procedures suggests that principle, and not naked neces-
sity, governs.
This structure is important because compelling state interests must al-
ways contain a countervailing value, the promotion of which justifies the
right's derogation. The fact that the government's purpose is compelling
is a consideration that places all the initial emphasis on the purpose and
the means chosen to achieve that purpose, not merely on the fact that it is
compelling. A judgment that the purpose is compelling is a judgment
about the relative importance of the value being promoted. A presiden-
tial duty to provide national security is no doubt compelling. The fact
that it is compelling means that the President has a strong motivation to
achieve the purpose, but motivation alone is insufficient for justification.
We might be highly motivated to apply any means that seem necessary at
the time to protect national security, without being justified in employing
the means chosen. Motivation is situation specific, but justification relies
on general principles applicable regardless of the particular circumstance.
Justification is found in the value (such as national security) to be pro-
moted, and the means available to promote that value depend on other
background values and constraints. When motivation driven by per-
ceived necessity pushes in one direction, justification, driven by law and
internalized norms, should sometimes pull in another direction to ground
and guide officials' actions.
Necessity changes the nature of the relations among persons and states
in ways that may undermine key features of that relation. Although it is
standard practice to allow the state to intrude on some protected rights if
the interest is substantial, not all rights permit such deviations. Necessity,
as a justification for rights derogation, entails no recognition of this dis-
tinction. Necessity arguments differ both in method and consequences
from the typical way of derogating from a constitutional right. They are
equally applicable to justify exceptional practices that occur outside the
ordinary rule of law as they are to justify ordinary exceptions within the
rule of law. Derogations recognized within constitutional practice are
ones that either promote the value at stake, or promote another, equally
important value within ordinary constitutional constraints. Necessity,
however, is as much at home outside the rule of law, and therefore need
not respect the values at stake in the rights infringed.
Even when derogating from the strict protection of a constitutional
256. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977) ("The touchstone of
our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circum-
stances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."'); Brigham
City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) ("[Blecause the ultimate touchstone of the




right, the necessity Constitution must preserve basic personal dignity.257
Returning to the domestic sphere of exigent needs in law enforcement,
the Supreme Court in Miranda recognized that even when considering
the balance between the police need for information and a personal right
against self-incrimination, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens. '258 As the Court suggests, re-
specting human dignity goes to the very heart of constitutional limitations
on the state's exercise of power over individual humans.259 This is a frag-
ile relationship between the sovereign people, the autonomous person,
and the state, whose legitimacy rests on each and whose purpose is the
protection of both. Torture radically disrupts this fragile balance.
By way of summary of the argument, it is not just the prohibition
against torture that is emblematic of the spirit of a whole body of laws, as
Waldron suggests. It is also the fact that the arguments used to justify the
use of torture know no legal boundaries-they are equally applicable to
justify the derogation of any number of other rights, emblematic or not.
If torture is necessary, then how much easier it would be to justify indefi-
nite detention of individuals, suspicionless surveillance, or the suppres-
sion of dissent. After all, no one gets physically harmed under
suspicionless electronic surveillance. Moreover, if contingent circum-
stances give rise to "states of exception ' 260 permitting the use of torture,
other circumstances might also justify a host of other derogations from
fundamental rights.
History has already shown that such derogations are possible on a large
scale-also justified by appeals to national necessity on behalf of state
security (including, in the United States, such actions as Japanese intern-
ment).261 It is entirely unclear what principle would hold the line against
the growth of necessity, especially once the additional topics-mass de-
tention, widespread suspicionless surveillance, etc.-get introduced as le-
gitimate topics of debate under the rubric of national necessity. This is
Slavoj Zi~ek's point about torture. It is a topic which we should not legit-
imate by talking about it as if it were in fact an acceptable practice in
some circumstances. 262 One need not posit the inevitability of dangerous
ratchets whereby one derogation of a fundamental right leads to others in
order to see that a principle that erodes the distinction between dero-
257. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 537 (1966).
258. Id. at 460.
259. Id.
260. See generally AGAMBEN, supra note 37.
261. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) ("Compulsory exclusion
of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emer-
gency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under
conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to
protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.").
262. Ziek argues that commentaries "which do not advocate torture outright, simply
introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate, are even more dangerous than an explicit en-




gable and non-derogable rights changes fundamental features of our con-
stitutional culture.
B. Two CONCEPTS OF PERSONS
The practice of state-sanctioned torture produces an unsustainable ten-
sion between two different conceptions of the "person" protected by con-
stitutional constraints. One conception of the person is the source of
political legitimacy for the state, the other conception of the person is the
object of state power. Torture undermines the first conception, and thus
undermines the legitimacy of the constitutional state.
First, the person, as construed within the liberal tradition, is the indi-
vidual human who possesses a realm of private choice and dignity and
who is free to create and pursue her own ends, however they might be
defined. In an act of founding, this individual provides political legiti-
macy for the state, reserving certain powers to control her bodily integrity
and to direct autonomously the course of her life free from state intru-
sion. In short, this political conception of the person is embodied as a
member of "the people" who, under the Constitution's Ninth Amend-
ment, possess retained rights which shall not be denied or disparaged. 263
Persons so understood are the foundation upon which state power rests,
an inversion of older systems of political legitimacy under which the per-
son existed by leave of state authority.
This liberal person is the subject of First Amendment protections, both
in pursuit of the values of autonomy and democratic deliberation. The
Supreme Court has articulated a core value in personal political expres-
sion, stating that
[t]he constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity. 264
To underscore the fact of political legitimacy grounded in this conception
of the person, free expression is protected "in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests. '265 This political system not
only countenances, but embraces dissent and discord-the sounds of
cacophony-out of which consensus emerges from the shared participa-
tion of persons committed to a common enterprise. In this endeavor to
ground politics in persons, the Court has made clear that "if there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, relig-
263. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.




ion, or other matters of opinion. '2 66
The second conception of the human is the individual who exists only
in relation to the state, on whom the state regularly acts to compel behav-
ior and impose constraint, and whose identity under the first conception
of the person is always subject to annihilation by the state. These are the
normalized docile bodies, who, at the extreme, when stripped of every-
thing else, make their appearance as what Giorgio Agamben calls "Homo
Sacer. ''267 What is so emblematic about the prohibition against torture is
that it has this power to strip individuals of everything but their bare hu-
manity. As Elaine Scarry powerfully argues, torture has the capacity to
unmake a world, the world in which we maintain narrative coherence and
separateness from the state.268 In seeking to compel the information
from the tortured suspect, the state configures the individual, not as a
source of dignity and integrity, but as another source of information vital
to the performance of state power.269 At the extreme, of course, when
the state faces an existential threat, that information will be vital to the
persistence of state power. But threats from terrorism, while they chal-
lenge the state's monopoly on violence, do not create existential threats-
though they do create informational needs in furtherance of state power.
But if the body is merely a vessel for information, if the need for infor-
mation no longer operates within limits as to place or person, then the
state, too, no longer acts within grounded sources of legitimacy and au-
thority. The state is limited by the boundary of bodies and persons, act-
ing by leave of the sovereignty of the people. It merely acts. Resistance
is not allowed, and thus, a whole conception of human personhood, as
beings who are capable of saying "no," vanishes. The Barnette Court ar-
ticulated the dangers that exist when the state allows power to suppress
dissent: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. '270 What makes assertions
of national necessity so problematic in this arena is that they would seem
to undermine this bedrock principle that "the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment ... includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all .... The right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind." 271
266. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
267. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 8 (1998).
268. "Intense pain is world-destroying. In compelling confession, the torturers compel
the prisoner to record and objectivity the fact that intense pain is world-destroying."
SCARRY, supra note 247, at 29.
269. Louis Michael Siedman argues that torture's truth is that it reminds us that we are
merely bodies. Torture's Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 881, 886 (2005). My suggestion is that
with tortures we vanish as narratively-ordered persons with histories and become the bear-
ers of state-required information.
270. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
271. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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Yet there is something perverse about an assertion of the right to re-
frain from speaking when such resistance would constitute a "clear and
present danger" of depriving authorities of information necessary to save
lives. 272 Violation of constitutionally authorized state censorship, how-
ever, subjects the speaker to punishment under due process of law, but
does not deprive the speaker of his or her dignity or autonomy. Compul-
sion to speak under torture can only occur outside of ordinary constitu-
tional constraints, where "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
273
More than an issue of political resistance, the conception of the human
on which political legitimacy rests disappears in the configuration by the
state of the individual without a privilege against speaking, even if in the
act of invoking that privilege the person is subject to punishment. Pun-
ishment under due process acknowledges a limit to the exercise of state
power and recognizes a separate realm of individual autonomy and dig-
nity. If the state does not respect this fundamental boundary constituted
by the person and her body, then, in an important respect, the body dis-
appears, and information is all that is seen and heard. In so doing, the
body politic also disappears. We all become subject to the all-knowing
needs of state necessity.
In this manner, conflict between the two conceptions of the person pro-
duces an unsustainable tension in which the body upon whom the state
acts displaces the person by leave of whom the state exists. Torture takes
away the ability to resist state power and to reserve the privacy of the
"inner realm" of human consciousness from state intrusion. Under the
normalized argument from necessity-the ticking bomb scenario and its
justifications-such a consequence may seem unexceptional. That is, we
might think the idea of preserving a conception of essentially private au-
tonomy perverse given the potential catastrophic consequences that
might otherwise follow. But notice again, the normalized argument for
necessity is not well-bounded in justification or scope. Accordingly, as
the use of that argument spreads, the space in which the one conception
of humanity operates shrinks.
To be clear, I am not advancing a slippery-slope argument that to ac-
cept torture in situation A will lead to all the consequences through situa-
tion Z. I am suggesting that the normalized necessity argument produces
both a rhetorical and political space in which a particular form of consti-
tutional culture sustained by one conception of the human gives way to
another. The liberal person has space to flourish only within the contin-
gent practice of constitutional culture in which state officials respect
human dignity and liberty. As a matter of constitutional culture-a no-
272. "Censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitu-
tion only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the
State is empowered to prevent and punish." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. One could argue
that the compulsion to speak is tolerated by our Constitution only when silence presents a
clear and present danger.
273. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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tion which I understand includes persons and citizens whose lives are
shaped through the law, in addition to the usual suspects such as lawyers,
judges, politicians and public officials 274-the stakes could not be greater.
As we have noticed, under the operation of necessity arguments, many
supposed "bedrock" liberal principles are exposed to a particular form of
contingency.
When necessity is used to justify the practice of torture, it undermines
the liberal conception of the person that grounds political legitimacy.
This conception views persons as constituted through "[1]iberty [which]
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. ' 275 Torture is inconsistent with
the liberal democratic conception of human dignity. When tortured, it is
not the person who speaks, but the body, stripped of its humanity, which
speaks.2 76 Torture is, accordingly, the ultimate manifestation of a legal
culture ruled by necessity. The necessity Constitution envisions a new
ordering of fundamental values. When necessity is the ultimate authority
for official action, circumstances, not constitutional constraint and com-
mitment, dictate what actions are appropriate.
C. THE STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Rather than requiring principles to shape responses to crises, the nor-
malization of necessity permits circumstances to shape the scope of prin-
ciples. This inversion has implications for how we see our relation to
many other constitutional principles, from the protection of political dis-
sent to the protection of more inchoate liberties, all of which may become
subject to more robust forms of derogation in the face of claims of na-
tional necessity.
One of the issues at stake here is our identity as a people, as well as our
affective relations. Do we want to be identified as torturers? Or, is there
some principle associated with constitutionalism and the life of liberty
that is inconsistent with engaging in torture? If we want freedom to tor-
ture, then we have to accept a change in character that will alter the na-
ture of our affective relations with others. We will figure persons as
sources of information in ways that alter our understanding of the dignity
and autonomy of persons. Such a refiguring of persons as information
resources would undermine the very reason why the resort to torture was
thought necessary in the first place. It will also change national character,
as we fear each other as potential victims of torture and ourselves as tor-
274. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) ("We can identify, for example, a specific subset
of culture that encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution. I
shall call this subset constitutional culture.").
275. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
276. "For what the process of torture does is to split the human being into two, to make




turers. We cannot practice and justify torture as something that does not
have far-ranging, unpredictable effects on our constitutional culture.
Reva Siegel argues that "constitutional culture supplies understandings of
role and practices of argument through which citizens and officials can
propose new ways of enacting the society's defining commitments-as
well as resources to resist those proposals. '277 If we come to adopt the
necessity Constitution or the practice of necessity with regard to torture,
we alter our defining commitments. Torture has developed as the para-
gon of pre-enlightenment, barbaric practices.2 78 "Torture is abhorrent
both to American law and values and to international norms. '279 The
spirit of this abhorrence, however, extends beyond the legalistic construc-
tion of specific acts as violating a statutory prohibition against torture.
The spirit of this abhorrence expresses our defining commitment to
human solidarity and dignity, our commitment to preventing state-spon-
sored cruelty.
If necessity countenances torture as required by circumstances, it is not
simply that the derogation knows no principled boundaries within United
States legal practice, nor that it undermines a concept of persons on
which political legitimacy relies, but also that it knows no principled
boundaries in unraveling an entire trend in international human rights
law nurtured by a rights-protecting constitutional culture. Conducting
what Harold Koh calls "norm entrepreneurship," human rights advocates
and constitutional democracies have led the world through a series of
multilateral treaties to recognize and legally protect certain basic human
rights, including the right against torture.2 80 The norm against torture has
been enunciated in several multi-lateral treaties, regional treaties, and in
regional and domestic courts. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ' 281 The Convention
Against Torture defines "torture" as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-
son for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion."' 282 The Convention Against Torture also directly confronts the
linchpin of the necessity argument with a provision stating that "[n]o ex-
ceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture. ' 283 Thus, there is no exception to
277. Siegel, supra note 29, at 1327.
278. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 4 (1978)
279. Levin Memo, supra note 169, at 1.
280. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,
46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 316 (2003).
281. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR. 3d
Sess., 1st Plen. Mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966) (U.S. ratified June 8, 1992).
282. Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, art. 1.
283. Id. art. 2.
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situations of perceived necessity, no ticking time bomb exception that will
permit the use of torture. In addition to the U.N. system, regional trea-
ties such as the European Convention, the African Charter, and the
American Convention, have all institutionalized the norm against
torture.2
84
In a series of rulings, the European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") have operationalized the norm,
clearly delineating the limits of official action. Practices similar to those
U.S. officials have been reported to use, including forcing detainees to
stand in uncomfortable positions for long periods of time and keeping
black hoods on their heads-practices employed by the British in interro-
gating Irish Republican Army suspects-were ruled illegal under Article
3 of the European Convention as inhuman and degrading treatment. 285
The ECHR has ruled that the norm against torture has a central place in
democratic society, such that "[e]ven in the most difficult circumstances,
such as the fight against terrorism and organized crime, the Convention
prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. '286 Such declarations intend to foreclose the possibility of
using the necessity argument to justify torture.
These international legal fora underscore both the breadth and the
consistency of the commitment to and acceptance of the norm against
torture, so much so that at least one U.S. court has recognized the norm
against torture as a jus cogens norm: "a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted. '287 The Ninth Circuit reasoned in Siderman
v. Republic of Argentina288 that because of the unanimous view of inter-
national and regional treaties and domestic rulings, "we conclude that the
right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right
284. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (enunciating the norm in the same lan-
guage as the U.N. Convention: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."); African Charter on Human and People's Rights art.
5, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 ("All forms of exploitation
and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing punishment and treatment shall be prohibited."); Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 ("Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected" and "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with re-
spect for the inherent dignity of the human person."). See also, Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 ("Torture shall
also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the
personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do
not cause physical pain or mental anguish.").
285. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65-67 (1978) (The court
reserved the term "torture" to "attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment
causing very serious and cruel suffering.").
286. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149.
287. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,332.
288. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
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deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm of jus
cogens.' '289 Although there may remain controversy over the norm's sta-
tus as jus cogens,2 90 the norm is undoubtedly one of the most widely
enunciated, institutionalized, operationalized, and internalized norms of
customary international law.
If our practices do not reflect an internal commitment to the norm
against torture, then the future vitality of that norm at home and abroad
is weakened. Just as transnational legal process operates by spreading
human rights norms, as Harold Koh advocates, 291 domestic legal practice
can work in the opposite direction to unhinge national commitments to
the norm against torture. Through contested constitutional visions,
changes in both constitutional practice and principle can lead to changes
in both international commitments abroad and constitutional practice at
home. Ordinarily, we consider changes in constitutional principle to fol-
low the political contestation of social movements, as individuals and
groups mobilize to expand the application of the principle.292
Such bottom-up contestation over the content and commitments of
constitutional culture is not the only source of changes in constitutional
meaning. As we have seen, top-down approaches can seek to entrench a
new constitutional vision that gives primacy to claims of necessity, free
from judicial review and unconstrained by other constitutional rights.
Even as the United States engages in extra-legal detention and interroga-
tion in opposition to both international and constitutional limitations, po-
litical and social contestation continues over whether our commitments to
human rights norms should be destabilized through such practices. 293
Changed practices create the conditions for a changed world, not only in
terms of the vision we bring to the world order, but in terms of normative
culture. In changing our constitutional cultural outlook, we risk changing
the international human rights outlook, shifting attention to actions taken
on behalf of national necessity even at the expense of protecting human
rights.
Torture justified by necessity alters the structure of justification for le-
gitimate action, granting power to executive officials over circumstances
and their consequences without principled limitation. When necessity
produces extra-legal actions, the norms comprising a broader constitu-
289. Id. at 717.
290. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
291. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1508 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599 (1997).
292. "When movements succeed in contesting the application of constitutional princi-
ples, they can help change the social meaning of constitutional principles and the practices
they regulate." Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Move-
ments, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006).
293. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2355 (2006)
(noting that the "Bush Administration rejects human rights universalism in favor of execu-
tive efforts to create law-free zones"). By contrast, former Administration officials defend
practices of unfettered executive action. See John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of
Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 799 (2004).
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tional culture remain available as tools with which to criticize the aber-
rant practice. Thus, resistance to extra-legal practices originates in the
values and principles that define and nourish a constitutional culture's
defining vision. Under the guise of necessity, the ready resort to extra-
legal measures can become normalized, however, as officials find it easier
and easier simply to act beyond the law, or courts find it more compelling
to find exceptions within the law of constitutional constraints. This is the
point Justice Kennedy makes in relation to abusive police practices: "A
Constitution survives over time because the people share a common, his-
toric commitment to certain simple but fundamental principles. ' 294 Com-
mitment to a particular vision of constitutional culture is what creates the
possibility of resisting alternative visions of a world under the necessity
Constitution. By maintaining an opposition between the normal and the
necessary, we sustain the ability to use law and morality to criticize and
limit the exceptional practice.
We oppose norms to necessity. When we allow necessity to alter our
practices, we risk altering our norms. Our norms are maintained through
our practices, and when we change what we do, we may change who we
are. When we change our practices, we may change core features of our
constitutional culture. Although some changes in norms may be inevita-
ble, we should ensure that changes follow from a robust constitutional
conversation about who we are, what we value, and what the world
should look like when engaging in particular practices.
V. LAW, MORALITY, AND NECESSITY
Moral intuitions seem to allow, if not require, torture in the exceptional
situation. Some have gone so far as to assert that "[f]ar greater moral
guilt falls on a person in authority who permits the deaths of hundreds of
innocents rather than choosing to 'torture' one guilty or complicit per-
son." 295 Moreover, regarding the expectation that officials are required
to do whatever is necessary to ensure national security, Judge Posner stri-
dently asserts "that if the stakes are high enough torture is permissible.
No one who doubts that should be in a position of responsibility. '296
The justifications for imposing the harms of torture to achieve desired
consequences, however, are not well bounded regarding the particularity
of the person or the scope of the harm. Accordingly, consequentialist
moral arguments fail to provide guides to right action by state actors. At
this point one may attempt a revival of deontological commitment to
principles. Perhaps the deontologist was too easily embarrassed into ad-
mitting that she would torture the suspect to save the city. The ticking
294. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2015 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
295. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, 77, 87 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
296. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLEC-
TION, 291, 295 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
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bomb justification for torture relies on the acceptance that at some
threshold, even ardent civil libertarians are willing to forego their com-
mitments for the sake of avoiding dire consequences. 297 According to the
consequentialist, having admitted that, all that remains is to quibble over
the details.298 Once one admits that there is a situation in which one
would agree that torture would be justified, then one stands accused of
abandoning principle in favor of consequences. In response, perhaps one
should not take the first step, but rather stand on principle. Even better,
one might argue that exceptions for ticking bomb situations are already
embedded in the principle in the first place. 299 However these refine-
ments in moral theory play out, I argue that they are irrelevant to consid-
eration of state torture in relation to constitutional constraints.
Principle is imperative here, not simply because it is justified by a
moral argument, but rather because it is required by a legal one. Princi-
pled constraints on government power are a necessary feature of consti-
tutional government. Without them, we do not have a government of
laws, but rather one of men. To the extent that we remain committed to
constrained government, charged with securing the blessings of liberty,
and answerable to the people as sovereign, then consequentialist moral
arguments are misplaced. Even if government may be morally justified in
engaging in torture under consequentialist arguments from necessity, it
would not be constitutionally justified, and thus would not exercise legiti-
mate authority.
Here is where the divergence of law and morality, as the positivists
would have it, produces a result that vindicates principle over conse-
quences. As H.L.A. Hart argued, one normative reason for preferring
positivism is that by maintaining a separation between law and morality,
we are able to use morality as a way of criticizing law (and vice versa). 300
Moreover, the divergence highlights the questions of whose morality and
which values plague non-positivist legal thinking. The question of torture
produces embarrassing monstrosities for both deontologists and conse-
quentialists, leaving us with no criterion for judging which monstrosity is
worse and whose morality is better. Here is where a turn to constitu-
tional tradition and culture provides principles answerable in both law
and morality to guide official action. Of course these principles are as
much moral as they are legal, but they are fully grounded in constitu-
tional cultural practice. Constitutional principles of human dignity and
liberty, backed by international human rights laws and norms and imple-
297. Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896
(2000).
298. Luban, supra note 201, at 1440 (regarding a ticking bomb, "[t]he idea is to force
the liberal prohibitionist to admit that yes, even he or even she would agree to torture in at
least this one situation . . . Now that the prohibitionist has admitted that her moral princi-
ples can be breached, all that is left is haggling about the price. No longer can the prohibi-
tionist claim the moral high ground ... [s]he is down in the mud with them, and the only
question left is how much further down she will go.").
299. See Moore, supra note 199, at 331-32.
300. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-82 (1961).
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mented through congressional statutes, provide a bevy of legal tools by
which to limit and regulate claims of necessity and the temptation to tor-
ture. Morality may provide us with the temptation to torture under con-
ditions of necessity, but law provides us with reasons to resist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional culture is fragile because it depends on the continuing
commitments of citizens, courts, and government officials to create and
sustain shared values and vision. There is nothing necessary about the
present constitutional order, and history has shown that dramatic shifts in
focus have accompanied very different ways of envisioning constitutional
culture. For example, the constitutional order prior to the New Deal is
dramatically different than the one that followed, not only for Congres-
sional power, but also for judicial protection of individual rights and for
executive prerogatives in foreign affairs and national security.301 In time,
we may realize that after the events of September 11, 2001, we occupy a
different constitutional culture, one that is perhaps organized around a
necessity Constitution. Significantly, President Bush claims that "[flor
America, 9/11 was more than a tragedy-it changed the way we look at
the world. ' '30 2 In the wake of September 11, executive officials have ar-
gued before courts, Congress, and citizens that they have the authority to
do whatever is necessary to protect national security, even if that some-
times requires engaging in activities outside of national and international
legal constraints. Civil liberties, it is said, must give way to national neces-
sity. Executive practices under this new way of looking at the world, as it
turns out, have also likely included interrogational torture of terrorist
suspects.
Torture, however, stands like a signpost, demarcating what lies beyond
the limit of practices recognizable from within a constitutional culture
committed to the dignity, liberty, and autonomy of persons, continuing
respect for whom the political legitimacy of the state relies. Justifications
for resorting to torture, if only in emergency situations, rely on necessity.
As we have seen, necessity can function either as a permissive principle
within the Constitution, freeing executive action from ordinary con-
straints, or as an extra-legal principle licensing unfettered lawless emer-
gency action. Under the necessity Constitution, rights-protecting
constraints no longer operate as principled constraints against official
practice. Principles that constrain only when convenient are no con-
straints at all. Under conditions of extra-legal necessity, executive prac-
301. See generally, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
302. President's Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc 1597 (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http:/lwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/
20060911-3.html. Such remarks have been almost commonplace in official rhetoric. For
example, Vice President Cheney opines that, "The attacks of September 11th, 2001, sig-
naled the arrival of an entirely different era." Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks
by the Vice President at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum (Mar. 17,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040317-3.html.
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tices retain the suspicion that attends lawless action. Here, however,
whether the Constitution serves to constrain depends on citizens, courts,
and Congress withholding their respective institutional consent to lawless
practices. Consenting to extra-legal practices, no less than finding a prin-
ciple of necessity at the heart of the Constitution, changes the character
of constitutional culture in indeterminate and problematic ways.
When we rely on necessity to override principled commitments, such as
the prohibition against torture, we change our practice and principles,
creating the conditions for changing fundamental aspects of our constitu-
tional culture. A fundamental feature of our constitutional culture is its
profound respect for personal dignity, integrity, and autonomy, as well as
its recognition that some rights are to be protected against derogation,
even against compelling state need. If we make necessity the structuring
principle of our constitutional culture, we risk undermining the very Con-
stitution it is meant to preserve and protect. Necessity normalized into
official practice unravels the distinction between derogable and non-der-
ogable rights and creates unsustainable tension between the person who
is subject to state power and the person who sustains state legitimacy.
By reckoning with the arguments employed to justify practices such as
indefinite detention and torture, this Article illustrates the celerity with
which a legal practice structured according to necessity will exceed the
constraints and shared meanings that define our constitutional culture.
Moreover, necessity licenses much more than we imagine when we justify
actions based on simple stories of ticking bombs. Despite the domestic
and international prohibitions against the practice, talk of torture has be-
come pervasive in our political lives, suggesting that something funda-
mental is at stake in the contestation over executive practices and their
purported justifications in the "war on terror." The question of torture
creates an opposition between norms and necessity, presenting trans-
formative practices that make possible contentious changes in constitu-
tional culture. We must confront questions about who we are, what we
value, and what world we envision when we are tempted to adopt the
practice of necessity. When we do so, we must recognize that attempts at
constitutional perfection, both at home and with respect to "the opinions
of mankind" abroad reflected in international human rights commit-
ments, all rebel against the practice of torture even under circumstances
of perceived necessity. If "We the People" are to hold true to our best
ideals in securing the blessings of liberty and protecting human rights,
then we must reject grounding official action on necessity, whether within
or outside the rule of law, and must thereby resist the temptation to tor-
ture. Our norms and traditions provide ample reason to overcome temp-
tation to live under a Constitution of necessity in order to continue our
lives under a Constitution of constraint.
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